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Posts from the ‘Child Support’ Category

Should Dad Be Forced to Cook Gluten-Free?

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Should Dad Be Forced to Cook Gluten-Free?

In the recent decision in Beaulieu v. Beaudoin, the court was asked to rule on several continuing disputes between now-divorced parents in relation to the custody, access and care of their four children, three of whom had special needs. Specifically, one child had been diagnosed with autism and ADHD, while two others had severe behavioral issues.

In the context of a hearing to resolve several ongoing and acrimonious issues, the mother asked the court for an order to force the father to follow children’s gluten-free diet when they are in his care.

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The court explained the mother’s position:

The [mother] says that she has invested significant time and energy into learning how to support the children’s needs and how to stabilize their symptoms through medication and diet. Her research has led her to believe that gluten free and casein free diets have been shown to have positive effects on children with autism and ADHD. She asks that the [father] be ordered to adhere to their dietary requirements.

The father resisted;  although he acknowledged that some of the children had special needs, he disputed the effect of gluten on their behaviour.  He had consulted the children’s doctors on his own about the role of gluten, and they advised that it was unlikely to have any impact.  The court added, “He goes on to list the [the mother’s] long list of dietary restrictions which he believes illustrates [her] own obsession with food and her need to correlate everything about the children’s behaviour on what they eat.”

The court considered evidence, in the form of a letter, from one of the children’s pediatricians.  While stopping short of prescribing a gluten-free lifestyle, it indicated “some evidence” that such a diet can be helpful for children on the autism spectrum, and that “Mom feels that she is doing much better.”

The court effectively discounted the pediatrician’s letter, noting:

He does not prescribe a gluten-free diet. Dr. James’ letter only reports what the [mother] has told him; this is double hearsay and has very little probative value. I am reluctant to make the [mother’s] dietary demands a term of any order without more persuasive evidence. To do so would expose the [father] to allegations of a breach of a court order. At the same time, the children are spending most of their time in their mother’s care and it is problematic if the [father] ignores her concerns altogether. This is a high conflict case. The parties do not need to be looking for new ways to antagonize each other.

In the end, the court resolved this narrow issue by ordering that the father must “respect the children’s dietary regime within reasonable limits.”  The court then went on to rule on a host of other contentious, equally-narrow issues between this warring former couple.  (These will be the subject of future Blogs.)

For the full text of the decision, see:

Beaulieu v. Beaudoin, 2018 

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

An Example of How Family Violence is Addressed in Family Law

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An Example of How Family Violence is Addressed in Family Law

There’s no doubt:  Family law disputes can get nasty.   Emotions run high, and intemperate conduct can quickly escalate.  A recent B.C. case addressed illustrated the type of misbehaviour that can result in one spouse getting a protection order against the other.

The wealthy couple – who owned assets around the world estimated to be worth $50 million – were in the midst of a very high-conflict matrimonial proceeding. They were scheduled for an upcoming trial to decide their property division matters, and their child support issues in relation to their 17-year old daughter.

The wife had earlier obtained a protection order against the husband, under the provincial Family Law Act.  To do so, she established to the court’s satisfaction that she was an “at-risk person” whose safety and security was likely at risk from family violence carried out by the husband. The court described the contents of that order:

The protection order included the following terms: it restrained the [husband] from attending at the family home in West Vancouver or [their daughter’s] school with a police assistance clause; it restrained the [husband] from possessing a weapon or firearms; it authorized the police to seize any such weapons and, for that purpose, the [husband] was required to provide the security code to the gun safe in the family home to the [wife’s] counsel; and, it restrained the [husband] from communicating with the [wife or daughter], save through counsel. The protection order was stated to expire after one year …

The protection order had been made necessary by the abusive conduct of the husband mainly toward the wife, but sometimes directed at their daughter as well. The court encapsulated that misconduct this way:

The vitriolic and abusive comments of the [husband] directed at the [wife] continued and continues to this day. The description of these communications by the [husband] by his counsel as “intemperate” hardly does justice to the word. He alleges, as of late May 2017, that the [wife] is “fat and laid back” and that she was a prostitute. These past and continuing comments are simply abusive, vile and hateful.

Nonetheless, about nine months after the order was granted, the husband applied to the court to have it set aside.

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The court reviewed the provisions of the provincial Family legislation dealing with protection orders, noting that the criteria included consideration of whether family violence “is likely to occur” against an at-risk family member.  In making this assessment the court was entitled to consider several factors, including: any history of family violence; whether it is repetitive or escalating; whether there is a pattern of abuse or controlling behavior; and the couple’s recent separation.  The court noted that for these purposes, “family violence” was defined to include psychological or emotional abuse (including intimidation, harassment, coercion or threats) and unreasonable restrictions on, or prevention of, a family member’s financial or personal autonomy.

In terms of satisfying those criteria, the court described only some of the evidence put forward by the wife:

The evidence of the [wife] in her Affidavit … is replete with instances where the [husband] has directed both psychological and emotional abuse toward both her and [the daughter]. He has repeatedly threatened, intimidated and humiliated both of them. It appears that this controlling behavior on the part of the [husband] began at least as early as September 2015 and escalated to the time of the filing of the Notice of Family Claim.

There was a visit by the [husband] in late April 2016 which was strained to say the least. During that visit, the [husband] was screaming at [the daughter] such that the [wife] was concerned that he was going to hit their daughter. The [wife] tried to push the [husband] and the [husband] shoved her out of the way.

I had no hesitation in August 2016 in finding that the actions of the [husband] toward the [wife] and [the daughter] in the period leading to August 2016 constituted family violence.

Likewise, the court rejected the notion that the provisions dealing with firearms prohibition were overreaching in these circumstances.

In doing so, the court considered the husband’s argument that the initial protection order had been premature, since he was currently living in Singapore and there was no evidence that he planned to show up in Vancouver (where the wife and daughter lived) to harass them.

The court pointed out that – to the contrary – the husband had sent the wife an email asking for keys to their Vancouver condominium, and stating that he planned to go there within two months. The court added:

To accept the [husband]’s argument is to contend that the [wife] had to wait until he showed up on the doorstop of the West Vancouver family home before she could allege urgency. The evidence established that the [husband] came to Vancouver on a regular basis and, given the acrimony in their relationship, the [wife] could not have expected that she would be given sufficient notice of a visit to seek a protection order. There was also ample evidence to support that giving notice of an application seeking a protection order would have exposed the [wife] and [the daughter] to further abuse and threats and possible physical altercations. 

After stating that it was more than satisfied that the initial protection order had been well-supported by the evidence, the court dismissed the husband’s application to have it set aside.

(Note that although Devathasan v. Devathasan is a B.C. case, an analogous remedy is also available in Ontario, where in certain circumstance a spouse, partner, or someone with whom the person had a child, can apply to the Family Court for a restraining order. The person making the application must prove reasonable grounds for fearing for his or her safety or that of any child in the person’s custody.  This is established through affidavit or oral evidence presented to the court.)

These types of orders are aimed at protecting family members who are at risk.  Are they the right solution?  What are your thoughts?

For the full text of the decision, see:

Devathasan v. Devathasan, 2017

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

 

Court Declares Excuses “Ludicrous” and “Preposterous”

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Court Declares Excuses “Ludicrous” and “Preposterous”

Family Court judges hear cases all day long, and it’s likely fair to say that they’ve “heard it all.”

More to the point, they’ve likely heard a wide array of what are (at best) improbable excuses from litigants, who are called to task for non-compliance with court orders, especially those relating to a failure to provide full and frank disclosure.

In a case called Q.X. v. J.R.L., the court dealt with the property and support disputes between a former couple who were born and raised in China, met online, and then married in Vegas a little over a year later when they learned the woman was pregnant. The marriage lasted 18 months.  The court was left to untangle a complex, often-contradictory narrative from the husband in particular, about his Canadian and foreign income, investments, family businesses, and other financial information that was relevant to determining the issues between the parties.  The court described some of his evidence this way:

[The husband] J.R.L. has provided no mortgage application for any of the properties he owns in British Columbia. He claims that he came to Canada when banks lent money fairly freely and it was not necessary for him to complete a mortgage application form. He has produced “loan” documents from his father, mother, and sister, but gave no evidence relating to the loan documents, and I question the validity of the documents. He provided some documents relating to his immigration to Canada, but they do not appear to be his application form, and of the documents he did disclose, it is not possible to tell if there was a declaration of income, because J.R.L. blacked out portions of the document.

J.R.L. has failed to disclose his President’s Choice Financial chequing account statements from December 2011 to April 2012. He has failed to disclose or produce any bank statements for his bank accounts in China. In particular, he has failed to disclose his Bank of China term deposit statements from April 2011 to April 2013; his Bank of China savings account statement from April 2011 to April 2013; and his China Merchant Bank statements. He makes the preposterous claim that the banks in China do not provide bank statements. He is not telling the truth because Q.X. provided her Bank of China bank statements, showing that banks in China are able to, and do provide bank statements.

Likewise, in a recent case called Farrukh v Farrukh Amin the court’s credibility assessment of the husband was short and to-the-point:  It gave no credence to his proffered excuses for failing to comply with previous court orders, specifically in connection with producing documents and paying Costs previously awarded to the wife.  The court started its brief ruling this way:

On the evidence before me it appears that the [husband] does not think court orders apply to him when it comes to the payment of costs and the production of documents.

First, the court took issue with the husband’s contention that he had indeed filed the financial documentation required by the Family Law Rules:  It noted that the materials were simply not in the court file as they otherwise would be.

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Next, it outright disbelieved him on the reason for his failure to pay Costs under a prior order:

To submit to the court that he did not know where to pay the costs is simply a ludicrous answer to the question of why he did not pay them.

The court noted that the husband’s lack of cooperation and excuses put the wife at a disadvantage, and precluded both early settlement and the court’s full determination of the issues between them.

And, to add to the husband’s legal woes, the court hit him for an additional $16,000 in costs and disbursements, for the latest hearing that his past non-cooperation and non-compliance made necessary.

For the full text of the decisions, see:

Q.X. v. J.R.L., 2015 

Farrukh v Farrukh Amin, 2018

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

Taking the Kids to See Grandma This Holiday?  Read This First

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Taking the Kids to See Grandma This Holiday?  Read This First

With the upcoming season of holiday travel almost upon us, a recent Ontario case provides a good reminder:  Separated and divorced parents must strictly abide by the terms of any agreement or order in place for travelling with their children.

In Shapiro v. Feintuch the court was asked to resolve a dispute between two parents – who divorced nine years ago – but who continued to have conflict over many issues, especially the travel arrangements for their now-14-year-old son.

Earlier in the year, by way of an urgent motion, the father obtained an order forcing the mother to provide him with the son’s passport, and allowing him to keep it as his house.  This was to facilitate the father taking the son to Florida.  Less than a month later, the mother needed the passport back, so that she could take him to New York to attend two family events including a Bar Mitzvah.

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Initially, the mother did write to the father about taking the boy to New York, and asked for his consent.  But at first the father avoided answering directly, and raised other travel-related issues with her instead.  As the court noted:

This led to a long series of emails between the parties over the next five days that grew increasingly combative, vitriolic and lengthy.

The court continued the narrative:

It should be noted that in her original request on April 12, 2018, the [mother] had contemplated travelling on the afternoon of Monday, April 23 and returning on the morning of Wednesday, April 25, 2018. If the [father] had consented to this arrangement immediately in his initial response, rather than waiting five days and many emails to do so, this might well have resolved the matter. But after the extensive and often bitter emails that the parties had exchanged between April 12 and April 17, 2018, the [mother] was no longer willing to entertain a proposal she herself had contemplated in her original email. Instead, by this point the [mother] was determined that [the son] would travel to New York for both family events.

Since she could not get the boy’s passport in a timely manner, she decided to take matters into her own hands and arranged for him to be driven to New York by her parents. Border officials let them through even though the boy had only a birth certificate with him.

All of this was done without the father’s consent, although the mother advised of the boy’s whereabouts by email later that day.   During the span of the trip, the boy missed a total of five days of school, plus a regularly-scheduled access evening with the father.

This prompted the father to bring a motion, asking the court to declare the mother in breach of a prior order respecting their children’s travel arrangements.  The court granted the father’s motion and made the declaration.

The court noted that in 2015, after extensive litigation, the parents had agreed to the terms that governed any travel with their children.  Those terms had been embodied in three detailed paragraphs of a formal court order.  It stated that the father was to hold the son’s passport, and that the mother needed to get his consent before taking the boy somewhere like New York.

In defending her contravention of these requirements, the mother claimed that regardless of that prior order, her taking the boy to New York was actually in his best interests, and that the father’s consent should be dispensed with.

The court said it might have agreed with that argument, except for the fact the prior order contained the terms the parents had themselves agreed to.

Next, the mother argued that the father had withheld his consent to the trip unreasonably, and that she had no choice but to go anyway.  The court rejected this notion too, saying that it had no power to examine that issue; the parents had made it clear in their agreement – as reflected in the order – that they were giving each other the right to grant or withhold consent as they each saw fit.  As the court noted:

… the Order does not permit one parent to dispense with the other parent’s consent to travel, simply because the travelling parent regards the withholding of consent to be unreasonable.

Absent the father’s agreement, the mother had ignored a clear court order when she took the boy to New York anyway.  The whole point of the prior order, the court noted, was to avoid this kind of uncertainty and confusion over travel, which was not in the boy’s best interests.

However, in terms of the appropriate remedy, the court rejected the father’s request for $2,500 over and above his legal fees, noting this kind of penalty was reserved for contempt-of-court cases, not orders that declared a party in breach. The court added:

In coming to this determination, I have given careful consideration to the [father’s] submission that breach of court orders must have real consequences. These reasons should not in any way be interpreted as condoning parties in family law litigation from ignoring court orders. At the same time, I would observe that, in my judgment, these parties do take court orders very seriously. Having clarified the fact that the [mother] breached [the travel terms] paragraph … of the Order, I fully expect both parties to comply with it in the future. That said, the parties should understand that any future breaches of [those terms] will likely have much more significant consequences.

The court also admonished the parents that, going forward, they should,

…  be “brief and respectful in their emails, making no reference to either party or parties or their activities. Had this rule been followed in the present case, it is entirely possible that the conflict and disruption over this matter might well have been avoided.

For the full text of the decision, see:

Shapiro v. Feintuch, 2018

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

Was Husband in Contempt for Not Achieving the Impossible?

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Was Husband in Contempt for Not Achieving the Impossible?

The facts in Malboeuf v. Hanna raised an interesting issue:   Should a spouse be held in contempt for failing to satisfy a court Order that was impossible to comply with in the first place?

At an earlier hearing to address issues arising from their separation, the court ordered the husband to designate the wife as the irrevocable beneficiary of his life insurance policy.  Under the wording of the Order he was required within 30 days to “make arrangements to change the existing beneficiary designations to ‘irrevocable’ beneficiary designations ‘in trust for the children’ (if allowed by the insurer).  The goal was to secure the husband’s child support obligations towards their children by making the wife the trustee of the funds.

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The problem was that the insurer, RBC Insurance, did not allow such irrevocable designations on its policies.

This prompted the wife to claim that the husband was accordingly in breach of the strict wording of the Order, and should be found in contempt of court. At the least, he should have circumvented the obstacle raised by RBC’s policy by taking reasonable, good faith steps to try to achieve that required outcome through other means.  For example, he could have obtained a further Order requiring RBC to make the designation irrevocable, or could have purchased a new policy that did allow such designations to be made.

The husband countered that he had satisfied the technical wording of the Order by making the request to RBC; from there, it was out of his hands.  The “irrevocable” designation would be in place but for the fact that RBC did not allow it.

The court reviewed the law on civil contempt of court, noting that to prove the husband’s contempt the wife had to show all three of the following:

1)  that there was a clear and unequivocal Order stating what the husband should/should not do,

2) the husband actually knew the terms of the Order, and

3) he intentionally failed to do what was ordered of him.

The court added that even with all three elements established, it still had the power to override a contempt finding if it felt the husband had acted in good faith to take reasonable steps to try to comply.

In this scenario, the court concluded that the husband was not in breach. First of all, the Order did not clearly and unequivocally require him to irrevocably designate the wife, but rather contained built-in wording that contemplated a potential hurdle (i.e. “if allowed by the insurer”).  That alone absolved the husband from being held in contempt.

Nor was there anything in the wording of the Order that clearly and unequivocally required him to take other steps, such as getting a new policy or getting a court to force RBC to bend its policy.  Without such added obligations being clearly placed upon him, the husband could not be found in contempt in this situation.

For the full text of the decision, see:

Malboeuf v. Hanna, 2018

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

 

Court Issues Important Ruling on “Double Wills”

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Court Issues Important Ruling on “Double Wills”

In some circumstances, we recommend  that clients prepare a “double” Will – more properly referred to as a “primary” Will and a “secondary” Will for a single testator.  The primary Will deals with estate assets that require probate; the secondary Will covers assets that can be transferred to beneficiaries without having to go through the probate process.

Done right, this can minimize a testator’s probate fees and administration taxes.

However, the ruling in a recent Ontario decision called Re Milne Estate addressed a question that can dramatically affect the legal validity of this kind of Will arrangement.  Specifically, the court considered whether a Will is still valid if it allows the executors to decide whether property falls under the primary Will or the secondary Will.

The testator in Re Milne Estate had created two Wills.  The Primary Will covered all his property except certain named assets, and except other assets that the Trustees determined did not need to be included after-the-fact.   The Secondary Will addressed all property owned by the testator, and then specifically included certain named assets, and included those assets that the Trustees decided could be left out.

This wording was problematic; the two Wills essentially worked at cross-purposes to each other.  To be valid in law, a Will of any type had to conform to certain requirements, most notably that it had to demonstrate certainty in terms of the subject-matter that it covered.   This included certainty as to:

  • The intention to create a legal trust mechanism;
  • The subject-matter or property committed to the trust; and
  • The objects of that trust or the purposes to which the property is to be applied.

After confirming that there is no legal prohibition against the use of multiple Wills in Ontario, the court held that in this particular case, the Secondary Will was valid, but the Primary Will was not.

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Although it met two of the other legally-required “certainties,” the Primary Will in this case fell short of meeting the requirement as to certainty of the subject-matter or property:  By giving the Trustees after-the-fact discretion it left questions as to the exact property that was subject to its provisions.  In contrast, Secondary Will included all of the testator’s property of every kind, without exclusion.  It overlapped with the Primary Will completely, and with no gap.

The court accordingly directed the registrar not to accept the Primary Will for probate, but allowed the Secondary Will to go forward.

For those with multiple Wills, this decision in Re Milne Estate signals a need to have the wording reviewed by a lawyer, to ensure that the wording is valid and achieves its intended goals.

For the full text of the decision, see:

Milne Estate (Re), (2018)

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

 

Russell Alexander Collaborative Family Lawyers’ First Annual Holiday Toy Drive

Poster for Russell Alexander Collaborative Family Lawyers' Toy Drive

 

Russell Alexander Collaborative Family Lawyers are pleased to announce the start of their First Annual Holiday Toy Drive. This year the drive will be supporting Bethesda House located in the Durham Region and A Place Called Home located in The City of Kawartha Lakes.

New, unwrapped gift donations can be made in the Brooklin office for the Bethesda House. They have informed us of the lack of gifts for children 13-17 years of age. Some gift suggestions for them include:

  • Sports equipment
  • Art supplies
  • Games
  • Movie passes and gift cards
  • Purses and backpacks
  • Make-up, lotion, perfume
  • Hats and scarves

The Lindsay office is accepting new, unwrapped gifts to be donated for A Place Called Home. There is no recommended age for donations for this organization.

If you wish to donate to the toy drive this year, it will be running from November 1, 2018 through to December 7, 2018. You may drop by with your donation in the Brooklin or Lindsay office any time between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on Monday to Friday. For further details, feel free to give our office a call at 905-655-6335.

Can a Parent’s Substance Addiction Justify His or Her Unemployment?

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Can a Parent’s Substance Addiction Justify His or Her Unemployment?

I have written several prior Blogs that showcase the court’s power under the Child Support Guidelines to “impute” income to a deliberately unemployed or under-employed parent, so that a proper calculation can be made as to the child support that he or she may owe to the other parent.  Recently, for example, we detailed a case where the court considered whether a support payor who was in jail could be considered intentionally unemployed or under-employed for these purposes.

The power to impute income to an economically under-achieving parent – in what the Guidelines state are an amount the court “considers appropriate in the circumstances” – stems from this principle:   Parents obliged to earn what they are capable of earning.  A parent who falls short of that will be deemed intentionally under-employed or unemployed.

The parent need not specifically intend to evade child support for this rule to apply; it merely requires that the parent has chosen to earn less than what he or she is capable of earning.  This can involve quitting a perfectly good job, or deliberately getting fired from one.  It can involve not looking for new work once a former job legitimately ends.  The court will then look at whether the parent’s actions are voluntary, and reasonable, and it is up to the parent to show that his or her decision is justified in a compelling way.

Needless to say, the given excuses that a parent may have for being under-employed or unemployed are numerous.  Courts must scrutinize these on a case-by-case basis.   After doing so, a court may find that the parent’s employment shortfall is justified after all, and that no income should be imputed to him or her after all.

On this last point, one of the more interesting scenarios relates to a support-paying parent with a substance addiction problem, as illustrated in a case called Lindsay v. Jeffrey.  There, the mother asked the court to impute income to the father at the $35,000-a-year level, which was what he was earning before he quit his job as a mechanic.

The father, in contrast, claimed his income was only $9,000 for the year in question.  He claimed that he was unemployed because of his drug addiction.

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In looking at the similar precedent cases, the court noted that they tend to go both ways:  Substance abuse has been held to justify a parent’s unemployment in some Canadian court decisions, but not in others.   For example, in an Ontario case called Hutchinson v. Gretzinger, the court rejected substance addiction as a justifiable excuse, reasoning as follows:

The trial judge accepted the affidavit of the legal assistant to counsel for the [father] as evidence that the [father] was addicted to drugs, including cocaine. In my view, it was an error to do so: better evidence was required. However, even if one were to accept that the [father] is a drug addict, his addiction is not a defence to a support claim. When one first consumes illicit drugs, one must be taken to know that addiction can result: addiction is a reasonably foreseeable consequence, as is the resultant loss of income or employment. To the extent that drug addiction is properly viewed as an involuntary illness, the initial drug use is voluntary and, therefore, it is intentional. It is wrong in law (and contrary to public policy) that a parent be exempted from his or her child support obligation because of drug addiction. …

Yet in a Saskatchewan decision called Kalanuk v. Michelson, the court accepted that the father had serious drug addiction issues that impaired his ability to work.  Although this did not absolve him of all responsibility for child support, the court saw fit in his particular circumstances to reduce the child support arrears he owed, because of it.

Returning to the present-day Lindsay v. Jeffrey decision, the court endorsed this second approach – but only with proper evidence.  As the court explained:

… The ravages of drug and alcohol addiction are observed weekly in this court in custody/access and child protection cases. Many parents who love their children very much and are very motivated to play an important role in their children’s lives have their roles in their lives profoundly reduced or even eliminated because they have a substance addiction over which they have little control. This court views substance addiction as a health issue. With proper evidence, this court is willing to consider that substance addiction is a reasonable health need of a parent that can justify underemployment or unemployment, pursuant to clause 19 (1) (a) of the Guidelines.

That said, the court found the required evidence was lacking in the present case.  The father had no corroborated evidence on the extent of his drug use, how it adversely affected his ability to work, and for what period of time (if any) it stopped him from working to his full capacity.  Nor, for that matter, whether it justified his quitting a good job in the first place.

The court said:

… It is not enough for a payor to come to court and state: “I am a drug addict and this is why I haven’t worked”.  The only corroborative evidence of the father’s addiction was a certificate that he completed a 60-day day treatment program (that was completed prior to the start date of this order). The court received no medical evidence about the father’s condition.  Cogent medical evidence in the form of detailed medical opinion should be provided by the payor in order to satisfy the court that his reasonable health needs justify his decision not to work.

As a final point, the court said it initially had “some sympathy” for the father over his drug issues, that sympathy had been “squandered”:  The court learned that “despite not paying any child support (and purportedly having nominal income) he purchased, in 2012, a truck for $6,000 and a 60-inch color television for $1,300. These are not the actions of a person with limited means.”

In view of the $34,000 per year that the father had earned at his mechanic’s job immediately before he quit, the court imputed income to him of $35,000 per year for child support calculation purposes.

For the full text of the decisions, see:

Lindsay v. Jeffrey

Hutchison v. Gretzinger

Kalanuk v. Michelson

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com