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Posts from the ‘Children’ Category

Should Dad Be Forced to Cook Gluten-Free?

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Should Dad Be Forced to Cook Gluten-Free?

In the recent decision in Beaulieu v. Beaudoin, the court was asked to rule on several continuing disputes between now-divorced parents in relation to the custody, access and care of their four children, three of whom had special needs. Specifically, one child had been diagnosed with autism and ADHD, while two others had severe behavioral issues.

In the context of a hearing to resolve several ongoing and acrimonious issues, the mother asked the court for an order to force the father to follow children’s gluten-free diet when they are in his care.

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The court explained the mother’s position:

The [mother] says that she has invested significant time and energy into learning how to support the children’s needs and how to stabilize their symptoms through medication and diet. Her research has led her to believe that gluten free and casein free diets have been shown to have positive effects on children with autism and ADHD. She asks that the [father] be ordered to adhere to their dietary requirements.

The father resisted;  although he acknowledged that some of the children had special needs, he disputed the effect of gluten on their behaviour.  He had consulted the children’s doctors on his own about the role of gluten, and they advised that it was unlikely to have any impact.  The court added, “He goes on to list the [the mother’s] long list of dietary restrictions which he believes illustrates [her] own obsession with food and her need to correlate everything about the children’s behaviour on what they eat.”

The court considered evidence, in the form of a letter, from one of the children’s pediatricians.  While stopping short of prescribing a gluten-free lifestyle, it indicated “some evidence” that such a diet can be helpful for children on the autism spectrum, and that “Mom feels that she is doing much better.”

The court effectively discounted the pediatrician’s letter, noting:

He does not prescribe a gluten-free diet. Dr. James’ letter only reports what the [mother] has told him; this is double hearsay and has very little probative value. I am reluctant to make the [mother’s] dietary demands a term of any order without more persuasive evidence. To do so would expose the [father] to allegations of a breach of a court order. At the same time, the children are spending most of their time in their mother’s care and it is problematic if the [father] ignores her concerns altogether. This is a high conflict case. The parties do not need to be looking for new ways to antagonize each other.

In the end, the court resolved this narrow issue by ordering that the father must “respect the children’s dietary regime within reasonable limits.”  The court then went on to rule on a host of other contentious, equally-narrow issues between this warring former couple.  (These will be the subject of future Blogs.)

For the full text of the decision, see:

Beaulieu v. Beaudoin, 2018 

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

An Example of How Family Violence is Addressed in Family Law

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An Example of How Family Violence is Addressed in Family Law

There’s no doubt:  Family law disputes can get nasty.   Emotions run high, and intemperate conduct can quickly escalate.  A recent B.C. case addressed illustrated the type of misbehaviour that can result in one spouse getting a protection order against the other.

The wealthy couple – who owned assets around the world estimated to be worth $50 million – were in the midst of a very high-conflict matrimonial proceeding. They were scheduled for an upcoming trial to decide their property division matters, and their child support issues in relation to their 17-year old daughter.

The wife had earlier obtained a protection order against the husband, under the provincial Family Law Act.  To do so, she established to the court’s satisfaction that she was an “at-risk person” whose safety and security was likely at risk from family violence carried out by the husband. The court described the contents of that order:

The protection order included the following terms: it restrained the [husband] from attending at the family home in West Vancouver or [their daughter’s] school with a police assistance clause; it restrained the [husband] from possessing a weapon or firearms; it authorized the police to seize any such weapons and, for that purpose, the [husband] was required to provide the security code to the gun safe in the family home to the [wife’s] counsel; and, it restrained the [husband] from communicating with the [wife or daughter], save through counsel. The protection order was stated to expire after one year …

The protection order had been made necessary by the abusive conduct of the husband mainly toward the wife, but sometimes directed at their daughter as well. The court encapsulated that misconduct this way:

The vitriolic and abusive comments of the [husband] directed at the [wife] continued and continues to this day. The description of these communications by the [husband] by his counsel as “intemperate” hardly does justice to the word. He alleges, as of late May 2017, that the [wife] is “fat and laid back” and that she was a prostitute. These past and continuing comments are simply abusive, vile and hateful.

Nonetheless, about nine months after the order was granted, the husband applied to the court to have it set aside.

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The court reviewed the provisions of the provincial Family legislation dealing with protection orders, noting that the criteria included consideration of whether family violence “is likely to occur” against an at-risk family member.  In making this assessment the court was entitled to consider several factors, including: any history of family violence; whether it is repetitive or escalating; whether there is a pattern of abuse or controlling behavior; and the couple’s recent separation.  The court noted that for these purposes, “family violence” was defined to include psychological or emotional abuse (including intimidation, harassment, coercion or threats) and unreasonable restrictions on, or prevention of, a family member’s financial or personal autonomy.

In terms of satisfying those criteria, the court described only some of the evidence put forward by the wife:

The evidence of the [wife] in her Affidavit … is replete with instances where the [husband] has directed both psychological and emotional abuse toward both her and [the daughter]. He has repeatedly threatened, intimidated and humiliated both of them. It appears that this controlling behavior on the part of the [husband] began at least as early as September 2015 and escalated to the time of the filing of the Notice of Family Claim.

There was a visit by the [husband] in late April 2016 which was strained to say the least. During that visit, the [husband] was screaming at [the daughter] such that the [wife] was concerned that he was going to hit their daughter. The [wife] tried to push the [husband] and the [husband] shoved her out of the way.

I had no hesitation in August 2016 in finding that the actions of the [husband] toward the [wife] and [the daughter] in the period leading to August 2016 constituted family violence.

Likewise, the court rejected the notion that the provisions dealing with firearms prohibition were overreaching in these circumstances.

In doing so, the court considered the husband’s argument that the initial protection order had been premature, since he was currently living in Singapore and there was no evidence that he planned to show up in Vancouver (where the wife and daughter lived) to harass them.

The court pointed out that – to the contrary – the husband had sent the wife an email asking for keys to their Vancouver condominium, and stating that he planned to go there within two months. The court added:

To accept the [husband]’s argument is to contend that the [wife] had to wait until he showed up on the doorstop of the West Vancouver family home before she could allege urgency. The evidence established that the [husband] came to Vancouver on a regular basis and, given the acrimony in their relationship, the [wife] could not have expected that she would be given sufficient notice of a visit to seek a protection order. There was also ample evidence to support that giving notice of an application seeking a protection order would have exposed the [wife] and [the daughter] to further abuse and threats and possible physical altercations. 

After stating that it was more than satisfied that the initial protection order had been well-supported by the evidence, the court dismissed the husband’s application to have it set aside.

(Note that although Devathasan v. Devathasan is a B.C. case, an analogous remedy is also available in Ontario, where in certain circumstance a spouse, partner, or someone with whom the person had a child, can apply to the Family Court for a restraining order. The person making the application must prove reasonable grounds for fearing for his or her safety or that of any child in the person’s custody.  This is established through affidavit or oral evidence presented to the court.)

These types of orders are aimed at protecting family members who are at risk.  Are they the right solution?  What are your thoughts?

For the full text of the decision, see:

Devathasan v. Devathasan, 2017

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

 

Cross-Border Abductions by Parents: Supreme Court Rules on Child’s “Habitual Residence” Under the Hague Convention

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Cross-Border Abductions by Parents: Supreme Court Rules on Child’s “Habitual Residence” Under the Hague Convention

A recent decision from the Supreme Court of Canada hones in on a narrow-but-important issue that arises in parental abduction across international borders – meaning situations where one parent removes a child to another country over the objection of the other, and in contravention of existing custody/access arrangements in force at the time.

In Office of the Children’s Lawyer v. Balev  the crux of the case was whether the Ontario court had jurisdiction to order the children returned to their father in Germany, even though they were happily living with the mother in Ontario.   The Supreme Court of Canada introduced the factual narrative of the case this way:

The story begins in Germany, where the family — a father, a mother, and two children, all citizens of Canada — were living. Because the children were struggling in school, the parents decided that the mother should take the children to Canada for 16 months to experience the Canadian school system. During that period, the father [suspecting the children would not be returned] purported to revoke his consent and brought an action under the Hague Convention for an order that the children be returned. While he pursued remedies in the German courts — unsuccessfully — the period of consent expired and the mother remained in Canada with the children. After the father resumed the application, a judge of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice ordered that the children be returned to Germany. The Divisional Court reversed this decision [on later appeal]. The Court of Appeal reinstated it. That decision was appealed to this Court.

From these facts, the legal issue arose as to whether the children in this scenario were “habitually resident” in Ontario for the purposes of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (the “Hague Convention”).  If so, the Ontario court could grant an order in the father’s favour to have the children returned.  Unfortunately, the term “habitually resident” is not defined in the Convention itself, although it has been considered by the courts of other subscribing states around the world.

In considering the matter afresh after several levels of appeal, the Supreme Court first noted the two main goals of the Hague Convention, which are:

  • Enforcing parents’ custody rights; and
  • Ensuring the prompt return of children to their “habitual residence” where they have been wrongfully-removed to or wrongfully-retained elsewhere.

The Court added that a determination under the Convention is not a custody order, but merely a mechanism for restoring the status quo.

The concept of a “habitual residence” could be considered either from the perspective of the parents, or from that of the child, the Court found.  Historically in Canada, it has typically been the parents intention (rather than the child’s level of acclimatization and wishes) that governs the issue of where the child lives.    Nonetheless, the Court concluded that a “hybrid” approach was more appropriate, meaning one that focuses on relevant considerations that arise from the facts of the specific case. That hybrid approach requires a court to look at:

  • The child’s links to country A and overall circumstances;
  • The circumstances of the child’s move from country A to country B; and
  • The child’s links to and circumstances in country B.

Pertinent considerations include the duration, regularity, conditions, and reasons for the child’s stay in a member state and the child’s nationality. No single factor dominates the analysis.

With that said, the Hague Convention does include an exception to the general rule that a wrongfully-removed or retrained child must be returned to his or her country of habitual residence in cases where:

  1. The child has reached an appropriate age and degree of maturity at which his or her views can be taken into account, and
  2. the child objects to return.

The Court concluded that these factors call for a straightforward assessment by the court.

In the end, the described hybrid approach to the concept of “habitual residence” best adheres to the principles that inform the rulings from other countries on this point, not to mention the overall intentions and goals of the Hague Convention itself.  These goals all have a harmonizing purpose that has been agreed-to by its contracting member states.

Having looked at the background legal principles, the Court resumed its review of the facts even though the issue was moot. (In 2017 a German court had granted the mother custody and they had been returned to Ontario).  It vindicated the father nonetheless, finding that an earlier court was correct in declaring the children were “habitually resident” in Germany and should have been returned there.

For the full text of the decision, see:

Office of the Children’s Lawyer v. Balev, 2018 

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

 

Russell Alexander Collaborative Family Lawyers’ First Annual Holiday Toy Drive

Poster for Russell Alexander Collaborative Family Lawyers' Toy Drive

 

Russell Alexander Collaborative Family Lawyers are pleased to announce the start of their First Annual Holiday Toy Drive. This year the drive will be supporting Bethesda House located in the Durham Region and A Place Called Home located in The City of Kawartha Lakes.

New, unwrapped gift donations can be made in the Brooklin office for the Bethesda House. They have informed us of the lack of gifts for children 13-17 years of age. Some gift suggestions for them include:

  • Sports equipment
  • Art supplies
  • Games
  • Movie passes and gift cards
  • Purses and backpacks
  • Make-up, lotion, perfume
  • Hats and scarves

The Lindsay office is accepting new, unwrapped gifts to be donated for A Place Called Home. There is no recommended age for donations for this organization.

If you wish to donate to the toy drive this year, it will be running from November 1, 2018 through to December 7, 2018. You may drop by with your donation in the Brooklin or Lindsay office any time between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on Monday to Friday. For further details, feel free to give our office a call at 905-655-6335.

Can a Parent’s Substance Addiction Justify His or Her Unemployment?

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Can a Parent’s Substance Addiction Justify His or Her Unemployment?

I have written several prior Blogs that showcase the court’s power under the Child Support Guidelines to “impute” income to a deliberately unemployed or under-employed parent, so that a proper calculation can be made as to the child support that he or she may owe to the other parent.  Recently, for example, we detailed a case where the court considered whether a support payor who was in jail could be considered intentionally unemployed or under-employed for these purposes.

The power to impute income to an economically under-achieving parent – in what the Guidelines state are an amount the court “considers appropriate in the circumstances” – stems from this principle:   Parents obliged to earn what they are capable of earning.  A parent who falls short of that will be deemed intentionally under-employed or unemployed.

The parent need not specifically intend to evade child support for this rule to apply; it merely requires that the parent has chosen to earn less than what he or she is capable of earning.  This can involve quitting a perfectly good job, or deliberately getting fired from one.  It can involve not looking for new work once a former job legitimately ends.  The court will then look at whether the parent’s actions are voluntary, and reasonable, and it is up to the parent to show that his or her decision is justified in a compelling way.

Needless to say, the given excuses that a parent may have for being under-employed or unemployed are numerous.  Courts must scrutinize these on a case-by-case basis.   After doing so, a court may find that the parent’s employment shortfall is justified after all, and that no income should be imputed to him or her after all.

On this last point, one of the more interesting scenarios relates to a support-paying parent with a substance addiction problem, as illustrated in a case called Lindsay v. Jeffrey.  There, the mother asked the court to impute income to the father at the $35,000-a-year level, which was what he was earning before he quit his job as a mechanic.

The father, in contrast, claimed his income was only $9,000 for the year in question.  He claimed that he was unemployed because of his drug addiction.

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In looking at the similar precedent cases, the court noted that they tend to go both ways:  Substance abuse has been held to justify a parent’s unemployment in some Canadian court decisions, but not in others.   For example, in an Ontario case called Hutchinson v. Gretzinger, the court rejected substance addiction as a justifiable excuse, reasoning as follows:

The trial judge accepted the affidavit of the legal assistant to counsel for the [father] as evidence that the [father] was addicted to drugs, including cocaine. In my view, it was an error to do so: better evidence was required. However, even if one were to accept that the [father] is a drug addict, his addiction is not a defence to a support claim. When one first consumes illicit drugs, one must be taken to know that addiction can result: addiction is a reasonably foreseeable consequence, as is the resultant loss of income or employment. To the extent that drug addiction is properly viewed as an involuntary illness, the initial drug use is voluntary and, therefore, it is intentional. It is wrong in law (and contrary to public policy) that a parent be exempted from his or her child support obligation because of drug addiction. …

Yet in a Saskatchewan decision called Kalanuk v. Michelson, the court accepted that the father had serious drug addiction issues that impaired his ability to work.  Although this did not absolve him of all responsibility for child support, the court saw fit in his particular circumstances to reduce the child support arrears he owed, because of it.

Returning to the present-day Lindsay v. Jeffrey decision, the court endorsed this second approach – but only with proper evidence.  As the court explained:

… The ravages of drug and alcohol addiction are observed weekly in this court in custody/access and child protection cases. Many parents who love their children very much and are very motivated to play an important role in their children’s lives have their roles in their lives profoundly reduced or even eliminated because they have a substance addiction over which they have little control. This court views substance addiction as a health issue. With proper evidence, this court is willing to consider that substance addiction is a reasonable health need of a parent that can justify underemployment or unemployment, pursuant to clause 19 (1) (a) of the Guidelines.

That said, the court found the required evidence was lacking in the present case.  The father had no corroborated evidence on the extent of his drug use, how it adversely affected his ability to work, and for what period of time (if any) it stopped him from working to his full capacity.  Nor, for that matter, whether it justified his quitting a good job in the first place.

The court said:

… It is not enough for a payor to come to court and state: “I am a drug addict and this is why I haven’t worked”.  The only corroborative evidence of the father’s addiction was a certificate that he completed a 60-day day treatment program (that was completed prior to the start date of this order). The court received no medical evidence about the father’s condition.  Cogent medical evidence in the form of detailed medical opinion should be provided by the payor in order to satisfy the court that his reasonable health needs justify his decision not to work.

As a final point, the court said it initially had “some sympathy” for the father over his drug issues, that sympathy had been “squandered”:  The court learned that “despite not paying any child support (and purportedly having nominal income) he purchased, in 2012, a truck for $6,000 and a 60-inch color television for $1,300. These are not the actions of a person with limited means.”

In view of the $34,000 per year that the father had earned at his mechanic’s job immediately before he quit, the court imputed income to him of $35,000 per year for child support calculation purposes.

For the full text of the decisions, see:

Lindsay v. Jeffrey

Hutchison v. Gretzinger

Kalanuk v. Michelson

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

Was Wife Entitled to $28,000 a Month?  Court Clarifies Purpose of Temporary Support

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Was Wife Entitled to $28,000 a Month?  Court Clarifies Purpose of Temporary Support

The goal of temporary support is not to “pay for the costs of imprudent purchases,” according to the Ontario court in a recent case named Angst v. Angst

The husband and wife had separated after 24 years of marriage.  The wife asked the court to order the husband to pay her temporary support – designed to tide her over until the trial of the broader issues in their divorce.  Despite showing actual expenses of $5,800 per month, and despite the husband’s existing $5,800 monthly payments, the wife requested a dramatic increase to the amount that he should pay.

She claimed the husband’s ability to pay support was far greater than the $107,000 per year income that he had shown on his latest tax return.  In fact, he had two corporations with retained earnings of $3 million overall, which had netted a combined after-tax net income of over $610,000 in the most recent tax year.

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The wife asked the court to deem the husband as having $718,000 in annual income, and to use the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (SSAGs) as a benchmark.  This would put her support entitlement in the $21,000 to $28,000 per month range.

The husband, meanwhile, conceded that he owed the wife temporary support, but felt that with the uncertainty around him dividend-based income and the corporations’ value, it was premature to set such a high figure.   The amount the wife was requesting was about four times the amount the couple had actually lived on, prior to their separation.

The court agreed that there was uncertainty around the husband’s income, including the fact that both parties admitted running some of their personal expenses through the corporation. The husband also owed some child support, which impacted the calculations.

Next, the court noted the SSAGs are not mandatory, but rather could be deviated from where the court feels it appropriate.  In this case, to award the SSAGs-dictated amount would allow the wife a far more opulent lifestyle than the one she’d actually enjoyed while married:

… [U]sing the SSAGs would result in a spousal support award that would give the applicant a radically different lifestyle than the one enjoyed by the parties during their cohabitation.  The [husband] deposes that the parties lived a modest lifestyle in order to save for retirement and to provide something to give to their children one day.  …

In addressing the wife’s actual needs as it pertained to the proper support amount, the court described the purpose behind temporary support orders this way:

The goal of a temporary support order is to maintain as much as possible the parties’ pre-separation lifestyle pending trial …

The court added that the wife had had incurred expenses that were not, strictly speaking, justifiable in the circumstances:

Since separation, the applicant has purchased a $455,000 waterfront home and spent $11,000 furnishing it.  By trading in her previous vehicle and with help from the [husband] she is driving a 2016 luxury car.  She even bought herself a $19,500 Donzi boat and trailer.  Thus, the applicant is now living roughly the same lifestyle that she had before separation.

The [wife] complains that she had to cash in RRSPs to purchase some of these things, but the goal of a temporary spousal support award is not to rebuild the recipient’s asset base.  Nor is it to pay for the costs of imprudent purchases.  The [wife] applicant also complains that she had to borrow funds for the purchase of her house at exorbitant interest rates that are costing her more monthly than they should.  But this is entirely the [wife’] fault.  She purchased the home while the parties were still attempting to negotiate a resolution of their family issues.  When that failed, she had to look to a mortgage broker to be able to close the deal.  In any event, the [wife’s] present needs of $5,800 per month include her mortgage payments.

The court ultimately concluded that to maintain her pre-separation lifestyle, the wife’s temporary support entitlement should be closer to the $5,800 she paid in actual monthly expenses.  Adjusting that figure upward to take into account the tax implications, it awarded her $8,500 a month.

For the full text of the decision, see:

Angst v. Angst

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

 

 

 

Does Clan Law Govern Family Dispute Between Indigenous Couple?  Appeal Court Hands Down Latest Ruling

 

Image result for indigenous lawDoes Clan Law Govern Family Dispute Between Indigenous Couple?  Appeal Court Hands Down Latest Ruling

The next chapter in the ongoing legal saga in the case of Beaver v. Hill has arrived – in the form of an Court of Appeal decision which potentially allows an important constitutional question on Indigenous self-governance to get a full hearing before an Ontario court in the future.

We have reviewed in the past about this case, which involves Ken Hill, who is a wealthy Indigenous co-owner of the largest cigarette company on the Six Nations reserve. He is resisting the claims by his former romantic partner, Brittany Beaver, for almost $86,000 a month in spousal support, and $33,000 a month in child support for a child they had together. Hill earns about $2.1 million per year, tax-free.

One of the key issues is whether this Indigenous former couple’s family dispute should be decided under the regular Ontario family laws, or else under the laws that govern their particular clan, which is the Haudenosaunee.  Essentially, Hill claimed that he had an Aboriginal and treaty-based right, protected by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, to have his family law disputes resolved pursuant to Haudenosaunee laws. He essentially claimed a constitutional exemption from having the Ontario court and family law processes to determine the dispute between him and Beaver.

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In a prior ruling on a motion, spanning more than 150 paragraphs, the judge dismissed Hill’s constitutional argument that Haudenosaunee laws should be applied to decide Beaver’s support claims.  She ordered those arguments be stricken from his pleadings, and directed that the matter proceed in the usual fashion, under the customary provincial family laws. The judge also addressed several procedural objections as to the adequacy of Hill’s pleadings on the constitutional issue, but refused to give him permission to amend them.

As we reviewed  back in April of this year, Hill had filed an appeal which asserted that the motion judge had been hasty in permanently closing the door to his constitutional challenge at such an early stage in the proceedings.

That appeal has now been heard and – from amidst numerous complex issues – Hill has at least been vindicated in his argument that the motion judge had been premature. The Appeal Court ruled that he should have been given permission to amend what were called his “woefully inadequate” pleadings, especially in light of the seriousness of the constitutional issue raised.   The court said:

The version of Mr. Hill’s amended answer considered by the motion judge was poorly pleaded and lacking in detail. Neither Mr. Hill’s pleading, nor the ramshackle way in which the constitutional claim was asserted and is being developed, does justice to the seriousness of the claim. … Nonetheless, as I will explain, it was premature to dispose of the constitutional claim at this early stage. It is difficult to evaluate Mr. Hill’s claim under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 at this early stage of the proceeding. It would be unwise to dismiss the claim summarily on such a scanty record.

In short:  Even in light of Hill’s shoddy pleadings, a summary motion to have them struck was not the proper way to deal with and dismiss his claims involving Aboriginal and treaty rights.

Instead, the court struck out Hill’s pleading on the constitutional issues, but granted an order allowing him to amend it with permission of another court. It also refused to have Beaver’s support claims halted until Hill’s constitutional challenge was fully resolved; instead, Beaver was allowed to obtain interim support for herself and the child.  This was the best way to balance her immediate financial needs while balancing Hill’s interest in having his constitutional claim determined.

For the full text of the latest decision, see:

Beaver v. Hill

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

Cheating Wife Busted When Husband Spots Her on Google Maps

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Cheating Wife Busted When Husband Spots Her on Google Maps

Many of my past Blogs have chronicled the use – or attempted use – of Facebook evidence in Canadian family law proceedings.  But here’s a little twist:  In a news item from Peru, a husband learned of his wife’s extramarital affair through an image he found on Google Maps, through the “Street View” feature.

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The photos shows his wife, sitting on an outdoor bench with a man reclined and leaning his head on her lap.  She is stroking his hair in what suggests there is an intimate connection between them.  Perhaps ironically, the image was taken near the Puente de los Suspiros (or “Bridge of Sighs”), which is a tourist attraction in Lima, Peru.

The husband uncovered the photos, which were taken by Google in 2013, while planning a trip to that area.  He was using Google Maps to look for directions.   After finding the image, he confronted his wife about the affair, which she admitted to.  They have since divorced.

Latin American news site La Cronica reported that the man posted about the incident on Facebook.

For further reports on this item, see:

https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/world/2018/10/divorce-after-cheating-wife-snapped-on-google-maps.html

https://www.travelandleisure.com/travel-tips/mobile-apps/man-discovers-affair-google-maps-divorce

https://imagesvc.timeincapp.com/v3/mm/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcdn-image.travelandleisure.com%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fstyles%2F1600x1000%2Fpublic%2F1539363024%2Fbridge-of-sighs-lima-peru-WMNCAUGHT1018.jpg%3Fitok%3DTbSrmZwA&w=1000&q=85

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com