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Posts from the ‘Collaborative Family Law’ Category

If You are Divorced in a Foreign Country, Can a Canadian Court Make Orders Too?

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If You are Divorced in a Foreign Country, Can a Canadian Court Make Orders Too?

The facts in Cheng v. Liu are a little unusual, but the core question was this:

If a couple’s divorce is validly granted outside of Canada by a foreign court, does this preclude a Canadian court from later making any corollary orders – such as rulings on issues of support or custody – arising from that same divorce?

The husband, an engineer, was a Canadian citizen who lived in Canada.  The wife lived in China and had never been to Canada.  They got married in China in 2006 and had a daughter who lived with the wife in China her entire life.  They separated about a year after getting married, in around late 2007 or early 2008.

The wife then covered all the legal bases:  She applied in China for a divorce, and custody of their child.  She also applied in Canadian, under the federal Divorce Act, to ask for a divorce, as well as spousal support, child support, and custody.  Finally, also in Canada under the Ontario Family Law Act, she asked for equalization of net family property.

Meanwhile, the Chinese court granted the wife her divorce and awarded her sole custody of the child.  The wife’s other Ontario-based claims were still pending.

The husband, faced with all of these competing actions requiring his response, asked the Ontario court to suspend (or “stay”) the proceedings so that the entire matter could be determined in China.  This led to several rulings and some procedural wrangling, and ultimately a hearing before the Ontario Court of Appeal for its determination.

Against this complicated background the Ontario Court of Appeal had a simple question to consider:  In light of the Chinese divorce order, could a Canadian court make additional orders relating to child support, spousal support, and equalization of property?

The Court’s conclusion was mixed:  The divorce-related issues were closed for consideration, but the child support issues were still up for an Ontario Family court to rule on.

On the first point – and based on longstanding precedent that considered the provisions of the federal Divorce Act – the law states that once the foreign Chinese court had made a valid divorce order, this removes the authority of the Ontario court to hear and determine corollary matters.  So on the remaining divorce-related issues, the Ontario court had no authority.

However, the situation under the provincial Family Law Act was different:  the Ontario court could still rule on questions relating to child support, since the foreign court in China had not already done so in its divorce order.   The Family Law Act allowed child support claims to be made even after a divorce, and the foreign divorce order had no impact on that.  Indeed, the whole purpose for the Ontario legislation was to ensure that parents provide financial support for their dependent children.  Allowing the Ontario court to continuing to make orders under the Family Law Act even though the Divorce Act provisions had been trumped was actually a harmonious outcome to ensure child support would be covered.

For the full text of the decision, see:

Cheng v. Liu

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

 

A Day in the Life:  Court Uses “Ladder” Metaphor to Get Through to Firefighter Dad

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A Day in the Life:  Court Uses “Ladder” Metaphor to Get Through to Firefighter Dad

In an upcoming blog about an Ontario court decision in which the court was tasked with sorting out a particularly acrimonious, high-conflict separation and divorce between couple.  The result was a written court ruling that took up more than 1,200 paragraphs.

Obviously, the court had quite a lot to say.  And what was especially noteworthy was the court’s attempt to “get through to” the parents in a manner that they will understand.

The court prefaces that unusually-lengthy ruling with the following comments:

In addition, of course, to the monies spent by the parties, there has been an incredible expenditure of community resources in an attempt to address the conflict this family faces.

The financial cost is just one aspect of the damage done to this family.

The emotional cost to the parties, and in particular to the children, is something that cannot be quantified.

This court heard fourteen days of trial.

This court, at the risk of being accused of being delusional or blinded by eternal optimism, has crafted a decision pursuant to which the court is optimistic that the respondent father’s mentality can be changed from one of “war” as it has been described until now, to one in which the objective is changed from “winning” and “destroying” the other parent to one in which the objective is to have an environment pursuant to which the children can be free to love both parents and can freely move back and forth between them willingly, happily and without the need for the intervention of any of the resources earlier referred to.

This court is not naïve and does not expect that that will occur overnight but on the other hand, this court believes that if it did not try to create that situation it would have let these children down and simply “given up” on them. This court is not prepared to do that.

The court’s next step was to comment on the approach taken by each of the parents throughout the protracted litigation, first to castigate the father, and then to laud the mother. About the father, the court used a metaphor that it hoped would resonate with the father, writing:

As will be seen in this judgment, this court has found that the respondent father has engaged in a “war” as two witnesses have indicated he characterized it at the beginning. The respondent of course denies that he said this but his actions speak far louder than any words that he could have uttered.

The respondent is an acting District Fire Chief and therefore the court has found it appropriate to use a word picture involving a ladder, being a piece of equipment associated with firefighting.

This court finds that the respondent has climbed a ladder and reached the top almost realizing his perceived goal. That goal was to have control over the children and to be in a situation where the mother of those children, being a mother whom he chose for them, was totally marginalized. He almost achieved that goal in that the children at their current ages have each expressed that they do not wish at the current time to have any meaningful relationship with their mother, nor to spend time with her on a regular basis.

This court hopes that the respondent father will see, as this court sees so clearly, that the wall that his ladder should have been against, and the wall that hopefully he will climb after he climbs down from this current ladder is one in which at the top of the wall is a situation whereby the children have a healthy relationship with both parents and can freely love each of them without feeling any guilt towards the other. Love is not a finite quantity pursuant to which if you give love to one of your parents you must take it away from the other. In fact, the children can also love the respondent father’s girlfriend as a “stepmother” without having to feel that by doing so they need to thereby not love their biological mother.

In contrast was the mother’s conduct throughout, which the court found was praise-worthy overall:

This court would be remiss if, in its summary of this case, it did not comment on the applicant mother. This court finds, as with any parent, the applicant mother is far from perfect. In fact, some of her actions, likely taken out of fear of losing her children, exacerbated the situation. This court finds that her parenting style is far more structured than that of the respondent father which “played into” his desire to alienate the children from their mother.

Having said that, the applicant mother has been subjected to not only emotionally abusive treatment from the respondent father and those under his “control” but emotionally and even physically abusive behavior from the children. The court does not “blame” the children as, there is an obvious reason why they are behaving in the manner in which they are behaving.

Many, and in fact probably most, mothers even those who deeply love their children would have “thrown in the towel” by now, but the applicant mother did not. That, this court finds, is not only to her credit but will be something that this court anticipates in years to come will be greatly appreciated by her children.

With that preface to the subsequent 1,200 paragraph’s worth of specific rulings designed to resolve the couple’s dispute, the court added – perhaps optimistically – that:

… this court has crafted a decision that it believes is one that could result in a 180° change being made in their lives from one of adversarial conflict between their parents, the extended families, and unfortunately the children themselves and their mother, to one in which they are allowed once again to “be children” and not have to constantly be concerned about the conflict between their parents.

The court’s stated objective is a good one, and it applies with equal pertinence to anyone embroiled in family litigation involving custody and access issues.

For the full text of the decision, see:

M.M.B. (V.) v C.M.V.

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

 

 

 

Can You Sue a Cheater for Damages?

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Can You Sue a Cheater for Damages?

These days, not a week goes by without some sort of sexual scandal in the news. Recently, it has focused on allegations of sexual harassment by prominent figures and celebrities but this merely adds to usual crop adultery-scandal coverage that routinely graces the cover of magazines seen while waiting in the check-out line.

I was reminded of an older Family Law decision the other day, which considered the question of whether one person can sue another for cheating on them, or for falsely promising to marry them or have an exclusive relationship with them.

The decision in Lee v. Riley raised exactly this scenario.  The matter came before the court the initially to consider whether the lawsuit actually raised any valid legal claims.  (Under Canadian law, this process serves as a preliminary “screening mechanism” for weeding out those claims adjudged to be entirely without merit, so as not to waste the court’s time (and the taxpayers’ money) on frivolous or otherwise untenable lawsuits.   The prevailing test at the time was whether it is “plain and obvious” that the cause of action cannot succeed.)

In Lee v. Riley the woman had sued the man for what has a rather novel claim.  As the court put it:

The plaintiff [woman] alleges that the defendant [man] failed to advise her that he was involved with another women whom he later married while he was carrying on an intimate relationships with her within a context of an apparent ongoing developing relationship. When she discovered the truth, the [woman] claims that she became ill and has suffered damages. The [woman] asserts a number of causes of action arising out of these facts, including assault, intentional infliction of mental suffering, and fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation.

Although it appeared to have sympathy for the woman, the court dismissed her claim outright, having found no supportable, legal cause of action in her pleadings.  The court wrote:

The [man’s] conduct, as alleged, is morally reprehensible and disgraceful. Nevertheless, the law has never punished either criminally or in civil proceedings, the untruths, half-truths and other inducement which accompany seduction, absent a fraudulent relationship or the presence of a known serious transmittable disease. The [woman] knew who the [man] was and knew the [illegible text] sexual acts being undertaken. The law cannot protect every person against the kind of behaviour the [man[allegedly manifested. Relationships involve risk-taking. People should be honest but it is well known that frequently they are not.

What are your thoughts?  Are there circumstances where the law should recognized a claim in damage by the cheated-on partner?

For the full text of the decision, see:

Lee v. Riley, 2002 CarswellOnt 5558

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

 

 

 

Saving the Golden Goose: Part I – How Family Run Businesses can Survive and Thrive after Divorce

Saving the Golden Goose: Part I – How Family Run Businesses can Survive and Thrive after Divorce

One of the common fears of clients who own family run businesses is how a divorce will affect the business they have spent their life building. While business owners have control over the work they put into their business and the legacy they are building for their family, they may have little influence over a relationship breakdown. The worry in regards to the effects of this breakdown on a business can cause additional stress above and beyond the heartache associated with restructuring a family.

In many family law matters involving children, the spouses are able to agree to cooperate in order to address the best interests of the children. In many ways, a family business can be used as a similar incentive: spouses can agree to cooperate in order to address the best interests of the family business. While fueling conflict is an almost unavoidable side effect of the court system, a collaborative approach is a very effective method in reducing the impact of separation and divorce on family run businesses. This process seeks to ensure that the business remains viable for both spouses, as well as future generations.

What is Collaborative Practice?

Collaborative Practice Family Law offers an effective alternative to the inherently adversarial court process. Both parties must enter into the process voluntarily, and agree to resolve their issues respectfully. While the court process is oriented based on the legal rights and obligations of both parties, the collaborative process allows both parties to generate options that best suit their family. This allows the family much more self determination in creating an outcome based on their specific needs. Specially training collaborative lawyers work with both parties to guide them through the process, and are available to offer legal advice and support to their clients when appropriate.

Both parties’ lawyers also commit themselves to coming to a mutually agreeable resolution. The parties must agree in advance that should the collaborative process fail, neither party may use their collaborative lawyer to advance their position in court. This creates an environment conducive to negotiation and settlement, outside of court.

The underlying philosophy of the collaborative divorce process is that the parties mutually agree to completely avoid the court process, with the result being a faster, cheaper and more amicable divorce or separation.

A Flexible Alternative to Court

As mentioned above, the collaborative process allows spouses to shape the outcome of their separation and divorce. In contrast, judges in the court system have limited statutory options available them when presented with these disputes. Their analysis is built upon a determination of the legal rights and obligations of the parties under the Family Law Act. Furthermore, family law judges may struggle to understand the time and effort that goes into building and running a business, and the concept that income is not necessarily guaranteed or consistent. Issues such as liquidity of assets, the risks associated with owning a business, and ensuring that funding remains stable are complex, and family judges are not necessarily trained to analyze these concepts. Due to these restrictions, often a court process will result in the sale of business at a significant discount, which ultimately results in a significant loss of family wealth.

Collaborative family law is an option that operates outside of the court system. It allows the spouses much more privacy than a court process does, which a huge additional benefit to those owning family businesses. Issues such as tax planning or corporate share transfers can be done with reduced publicity. Both spouses are able to sit down with one another, and their lawyers, to discuss a solution that is beneficial to both the business and the family unit. Spouses can determine whether or not it is a realistic option to continue to operate the business jointly, or if one should step down. In the latter situation, flexible payment structures can be created to ensure that the business is not destroyed in the wake of one spouse leaving. This fosters the health of the family business, and promotes growth and stability for future income and the building of capital which ultimately supports the family.

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

Part II

Part III

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Long-Awaited Update to Federal Child Support Guidelines

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Long-Awaited Update to Federal Child Support Guidelines

Important news for those who pay – or are eligible to receive – child support anywhere in Canada.

What are the “Guidelines”?

As most of my readers will know, the Federal Child Support Guidelines (the “Guidelines”) are the government-sponsored tool that help separated and divorcing parents set the appropriate amounts of child support that must be paid in respect of the children they have together.

The Federal Child Support Tables, which reflect the principles and calculations mandated by the Guidelines, set out the basic monthly amounts of child support that are result from various permutations.

The Guidelines and the corresponding Tables have been in force since late 2011, and until recently have reflected the calculations that accord with 2011 tax rules.

What’s New?

The Guidelines and corresponding Tables have been amended to reflect more recent tax rules, and have been incorporated into an updated version that takes effect on November 22, 2017. The official (and updated) Federal Child Support Tables, plus additional information and some “legalese” about these new amendments, are located here.

Where, and When?

As with the last version of the simplified Tables in PDF, there is a streamlined, simplified version of the 2017 Tables (also in PDF).  There is also a Child Support Table Look-up for both the 2011 and 2017 versions.  There is also an updated, Step-by-Step Guide.   (Note however that these streamlined and simplified versions are not “official”; only the original Federal Child Support Guidelines and Tables are considered legally-authoritative as to child support amounts.  This also means that the amounts of calculated support may be different when using the official Guildelines or Tables versus the more simplified tools).

One final point:  the new 2017 Guidelines and Tables come into force on November 21, 2017.   For people who need to determine how much child support is owed for a period before that date, the prior version of the Guidelines should still be used.  (And for those who need to calculate child support for a period earlier than December 31, 2011, an even earlier version of the Tables should be consulted.)

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

 

Should (Another) 20-Year-Old Cohabitation Agreement Be Upheld?

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Should (Another) 20-Year-Old Cohabitation Agreement Be Upheld?

A few weeks ago, I wrote about a case in which the court was asked whether a separation agreement signed by a couple 20 years earlier should be upheld.

Coincidentally, another recent Ontario Court of Appeal case involved a similar circumstance.

When the couple started living together 20 years ago – and at the husband’s insistence, since he’d had a prior relationship end acrimoniously – they signed a cohabitation agreement.  The husband took care of having it drafted, and he presented it to the wife for her signature.  He wanted the security of having the agreement in place before moving forward in the relationship and buying a home with her.

The wife did not have independent legal advice at the time, although she was given the opportunity to obtain it.  Under the terms of the agreement she signed, the wife agreed to give up all her claims to spousal support.

Still, when they separated 20 years later, she claimed for spousal support nonetheless.  The trial judge upheld the separation agreement, and dismissed her claim for support.  The wife brought an appeal.

In evaluating whether to allow that appeal, the court had to embark on a two-stage analysis, the first stage of which required it to:

1) look at the circumstances surrounding the negotiation and execution of the agreement, to determine whether there was any reason to discount it; and then

2) consider the substance of the agreement, to determine whether it was in substantial compliance with the general objectives of the Divorce Act at the time it was formed.

Then, in the second stage, the court had to consider – now 20 years later – whether the wife had established that the agreement no longer reflects the original intention of the parties, and whether the cohabitation agreement is still in substantial compliance with the legislated objectives of the modern-day Divorce Act.

Applying those standards here, the wife argued that the agreement was invalid, and that the trial judge failed to consider certain important facts when applying this two-stage test, namely:

  • That there was a power imbalance between her and the husband;
  • That she had not discussed spousal support with the husband;
  • That the husband’s financial disclosure was incomplete; and
  • That she did not have independent legal advice.

While conceding that she was not coerced, the wife argued that the agreement simply did not align with the overall objectives of the Divorce Act, whether now or back when it was signed.  This was particularly true since the couple went on to have an 18-year relationship, they had two children together for whom the wife bore the primary responsibility, and his income exceeded hers.

The Appeal Court considered the wife’s arguments.  After examining the objectives of the legislation, it rejected her spousal support request. There had been no error of law or misapprehension of fact by the trial judge, who carefully reviewed the relevant test and found:

  • The wife was aware of the husband’s desire to have a cohabitation agreement.
  • They had discussed the cohabitation agreement before the wife received it.
  • She was aware of all of the husband’s sources of income and assets, but did not pursue further disclosure.
  • She skimmed over the cohabitation agreement, reading some parts but not others.
  • There was no fraud, coercion, or duress.
  • Although given the opportunity, the wife did not seek independent legal advice even though – on her evidence – she had six weeks to do so.
  • At the time of signing the agreement, the wife thought it was fair and that it fairly outlined the parties’ discussions regarding the purchase of a house.
  • The agreement is in substantial compliance with the Divorce Act.

The court noted that the trial judge was entitled to make the findings that he did on the evidence, and are entitled to deference from appeal court.  It added that even if the cohabitation agreement did not exist, on all the facts the wife would not be entitled to spousal support anyway.  The court dismissed her appeal.

For the full text of the decision, see:

Smith v. Smith

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

 

 

Can Court Order be Set Aside Due to Wife’s ADHD?

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Can Court Order be Set Aside Due to Wife’s ADHD?

In a case called Hatuka v. Segal, the couple separated in 2016 and started the process of untangling their financial affairs.  The wife continued to live in the $1.7 million matrimonial home with their two school-aged children.

By early 2017, the husband was having financial challenge:  He could not afford to service the home’s $610,000 mortgage and also carry the costs of a separate residence.   He asked the court to compel a sale of the former matrimonial home.   After two court hearing dates in which wife appeared without counsel and requested an adjournment, the court finally granted the husband’s request and ordered the home sold immediately.

The wife then brought a motion to have the order set aside.  She relied on Rule 25(19) of the Family Law Rules, which allows a court order to be changed in certain circumstances, namely those involving fraud, mistake, or lack of notice.  (And – as was clarified in a recent Blog, a court has recently concluded that – despite its wording – the Rule allows for orders not merely to be “changed”, but to be set aside entirely as well).

The wife – who happened to be a foreign-trained but non-practicing lawyer – claimed that to sell the home now would bring her hardship and distress, since there were no child or spousal support orders yet in place.  Although both spouses filed extensive materials in support of their respective positions, the court noted that the wife’s included a 93-page personal affidavit with 32 exhibits.

In examining the merits of wife’s argument on the motion, the court began by stating:

 The basis upon which [the wife] seeks to apply Rule 25(19) to set aside the Order of March 22, 2017 is unclear. …

[The wife] does not raise any issue of mistake.

[The wife] does not raise any issue of lack of notice or non-attendance.

[The wife’s] affidavit of August 18, 2017 claims that she has suffered litigation disadvantage as a result of the following assertions.  These were the initial focus of her counsel’s submissions on this motion to set aside:

(a)               she has ADHD and learning disabilities;

(b)               she is a recent immigrant with limited English skills;

(c)               she has been largely self-represented, with gaps in representation; and

(d)               she strongly believes that [the husband] has taken advantage of her, while abusing the court process.

The court concluded simply:  “These are not grounds for a Rule 25(19) analysis.”  The court also rejected the wife’s contention that the husband had failed to disclose his full income, and there had accordingly been fraud, adding:

Setting aside an order under Rule 25(19) (a) carries a high threshold.  Fraud within Rule 25(19)(a) does not have a special meaning outside the common law.  A moving party must clearly prove that the other party knowingly or recklessly made a false statement with knowledge of the falsehood, and did so with wrongful intent.

The court dismissed the wife’s motion.

For the full text of the decision, see:

Hatuka v. Segal 

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

 

 

 

Moving with a Child: Mother’s Views Take a Back Seat to “Super ordinate Considerations” Affecting Child

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Moving with a Child: Mother’s Views Take a Back Seat to “Super ordinate Considerations” Affecting Child

In cases where spouses are separated or divorced, the decision of where a parent can live and work is no longer his or her alone.   Rather, the Family Court may become involved, and may be asked to give the parent permission to relocate, particularly if that involves moving with the child to a faraway community or jurisdiction, such that convenient access by the other parent is foreclosed.

Recently I talked about a noteworthy decision in a case called Porter v. Bryan where the Ontario Court of Appeal considered the various interests that must be considered when granting (or denying) permission in such cases.

In identifying those factors, the Court drew from a decision by the Supreme Court of Canada in a landmark case called Gordon v. Goertz, where the country’s top Court said:

…the views of the custodial parent, who lives with the child and is charged with making decisions in its interest on a day-to-day basis, are entitled to great respect and the most serious consideration. The decision of the custodial parent to live and work where he or she chooses is likewise entitled to respect, barring an improper motive reflecting adversely on the custodial parent’s parenting ability.

However, while the custodial parent’s views are entitled to “serious consideration,” and were part of a balancing of the two parents’ competing interests as well, it was actually the child’s best interests that were to be given what the court called “superordinate consideration”, with the entire analysis to be determined using a child-centred perspective.   This was in line with the Court’s own prior ruling in a case called Berry v. Berry as well.

Applying these principles to the fact situation in Porter v. Bryan:   While the mother’s reasons for moving – while entitled to “great respect” – were relevant only to the extent that they related to her ability to meet the needs of her son.   The overall focus was to remain – at all times – on what was in the best interests of the child.

For the full text of the decisions, see:

Berry v. Berry

Porter v. Bryan

Gordon v. Goertz

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

If the Wife Goes to Stay with Her Mother – Does the “Clock” on their Relationship Start Over?

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If the Wife Goes to Stay with Her Mother – Does the “Clock” on their Relationship Start Over?

In Whalen-Byrne v. Byrne, the issue for the family court seemed simple enough: It was to determine the precise duration of the former couple’s relationship, which in turn would drive the duration of spousal support the husband had been adjudged to owe the wife.

And the beginning and end dates were uncontentious:  both husband and wife agreed that they began living together in 1993, and separated in 2010, which on a straightforward calculation was a span of 17 years.

But the problem was that at one point – from October 1996 to March 1997 – the wife moved out of the matrimonial home and went to stay with her mother.    After this brief separation they reconciled, and went on to get married a few years later.

The court was therefore left to determine what effect this separation had on the duration of their union.  A trial court had pegged it to be 13 years, on the basis that the separation essentially “restarted the clock” on their relationship, and that it really only commenced to run after they reconciled.  The trial judge explained it this way:

It appears that following the [wife] moving in with her mother the parties continued to be open to the possibility of continuing a relationship; however, both parties were taking steps to put distance between themselves (i.e. cessation of cohabitation and pursuit of relationships with other persons other than the other party). The most reasonable interpretation is that the parties intended to be separate from one another subject, at best, to the possibility of resumption of cohabitation. I find therefore that the period of cohabitation for consideration in respect of the [wife’s] claim for spousal support commences March 1997 and concludes with separation on April 10, 2010 for a period of thirteen years.

The wife appealed this ruling, and the Court of Appeal agreed with her reasoning.

In determining the length of cohabitation, the trial judge had been incorrect to “reset” it at the reconciliation point.  Instead, the facts showed that even when the wife went to live with her mother, the couple never formally separated; they merely had what the court called an “interim separation” that included “the possibility of resumption of cohabitation.”  In drawing this conclusion, the court considered the following evidence:

  • They lived apart for only a brief 5-month period;
  • They did not separate their finances;
  • The husband continued to support he wife financially, including allowing her to use a credit card in his name;
  • The wife took only a small suitcase of clothes with her, and no furniture;
  • Although the wife went on a few dates with another man, she was not involved in another relationship;
  • In December 1996, the husband proposed marriage to the wife with a ring and in front of their children, to which she replied “not yet”; and,
  • By February 1997 the parties were discussing marriage.

The Appeal Court concluded that for determining the duration of the husband’s spousal support obligation, the correct period of cohabitation was 16 years and 10 months, less 5 months for the brief separation, for a total of about 16.5 years.

The Court recalculated the wife’s support entitlement accordingly, and determined that she was entitled to spousal support from the husband that would last 14 years from the agreed date of their separation in 2010.

For the full text of the decision, see:

Whalen-Byrne v. Byrne

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

Mother’s Bid to Relocate Child – Was it Just a Pretext to Join New Romantic Partner?

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Mother’s Bid to Relocate Child – Was it Just a Pretext to Join New Romantic Partner?

The parents of a 5-year old boy had separated in 2015, and had a court-approved agreement as to joint custody and shared parenting.  The mother now wanted to relocate with her son from Cochrane, Ontario to Thunder Bay where she had multiple job offers waiting.  She had recently quit her job as a prison transport officer in Cochrane, which did not allow her to properly fulfill her childcare responsibilities. As the court explained:

…. [H]er schedule was unpredictable; sometimes working out of town, sometimes working overtime, sometimes both, and never knowing until the last minute. This would have impaired her ability to care for her son – not knowing in advance whether she would be called in to work in the morning before he went to school, or whether she would be home in time to pick him up again – but her employer temporarily accommodated her with a schedule that avoided unpredictable deployment. Eventually, however, her employer withdrew this accommodation. After exhausting her vacation time and sick leave, the mother resigned her position. Prior to her resignation, her employer invited her to apply for another position in Cochrane with a more parenting-friendly schedule. She was successful, but the employer subsequently had to revoke the offer.

The mother said the move to Thunder Bay was necessary to remain financially viable and provide for her son, and that as the son’s primary caregiver, her decisions about where to live and work out to be given considerable weight.

The father objected to the mother’s plan.  For one thing, it would strip him of the chance to influence his son.   For another, he claimed the mother’s alleged need to move was merely a pretext to be with her new romantic partner, who also lived in Thunder Bay.   He also questioned her lack of ability to find new work in Cochrane, and felt that – since she had quit her job – her current state of financial hardship was self-imposed.

The mother’s bid to move had been rejected earlier by a motion judge, who discounted the allegation that the ostensible need for the move was a pretext.  However, the judge did conclude that both parents’ views had equal weight, and that the resolution called for a simple balancing of pros and cons between Cochrane and Thunder Bay, from the perspective of how the boy might benefit. In the end, the motion judge concluded that the mother should be able to find suitable work in Cochrane if she tried.

The Appeal Court saw things differently, and granted the mother’s appeal.

First of all, the motion judge had erred in not characterizing the mother as the primary caregiver, and in not giving her particular reasons for moving “serious consideration.”  Also, the judge was wrong in deciding that the mother’s financial circumstances were not self-imposed; they were brought on by the employer’s withdrawal of prior accommodation of her childcare responsibilities.  Nor was there any basis for the judge to conclude that the mother could likely find work in Cochrane – in fact the evidence showed otherwise.

The Appeal Court explained:

There is, in our view, a valid and compelling parenting-based reason for the move: it is necessary to enable the primary caregiver to remain financially viable while providing care for the child. The mother has done all she can be expected to do to secure employment in Cochrane. It has not worked out, and there is no good reason for her and her son to live in poverty when she has secured employment in Thunder Bay that will allow her both to parent her son and to provide economically for him.

The court also said it was “encouraged” in this regard by the fact that the mother had offered to provide air travel to Cochrane for the child, which was one of her employment benefits at one of the Thunder Bay jobs.  She also offered to accommodate the father’s work schedule as a forest firefighter when he was deployed across Canada.

The court granted the mother’s appeal, allowing her to move with the child to Thunder Bay, and ordered a new access regime, with the parents working out an acceptable access schedule between them.

For the full text of the decision, see:

Porter v. Bryan

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