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Posts from the ‘Separation’ Category

Online Game ‘Fortnite’ Cited in Hundreds of Divorces

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Online Game ‘Fortnite’ Cited in Hundreds of Divorces

The online video game “Fortnite” which has grossed over $1 billion in revenue since its launch in 2017 and 125 million users, has recently been discovered to have been one of the reasons that at least 200 couples in the United Kingdom have cited for divorce.

Divorce Online, a U.K. company which offers insight into divorce resources and services recently posted a blog indicating that they had noticed many of the inquires and petitions they were reviewing had mentioned the extended use of the game as a contributing factor for the couples divorce wishes. The findings also showed that these those who cited the game were for the majority from couples where one of the parties played the game, and the other did not.

 

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A Divorce Online spokesperson also stressed that although the game’s influences were only evident roughly 5% of the total petitions this year, there is a link between “gaming disorder” and other addictions to drugs, alcohol or gambling.  In June, the World Health Organization (WHO) had officially recognized “gaming disorder” as a mental health related issue. The disorder has shown to have negative effects on relationships due to the precedence that gaming takes to the person over other activities.

Time will tell if this is a mere blimp for couples reasons for a divorce but the popularity for “Fortnite” does not seem to be slowing down anytime soon as it currently maintains nearly 40 million players each month.

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

 

Deciding to Separate?  Some Noteworthy Points About the “Valuation Date” in Family Law

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Deciding to Separate?  Some Noteworthy Points About the “Valuation Date” in Family Law

A basic concept in Ontario Family Law is that, once spouses decide to separate, their respective entitlement to the matrimonial property they have brought into the relationship and accumulated during the marriage has to be assessed.  That assessment takes place on what is described in section 4(1) of the Family Law Act (FLA) as the “valuation date,” which is defined as:

The date the spouses separate and there is no reasonable prospect that they will resume cohabitation.

Often – but not always – the valuation date will be the same as the formal separation date, which is often the date one spouse moves out of the former matrimonial home. But as we all know, life is not always that simple, and relationships do not always end cleanly.

Here are some important points that the court has clarified about this “valuation date”, in a case called Strobele v. Strobele:

  • The purpose of this FLA definition is to fix the date on which the economic partnership should be fairly terminated.
  • This definition has two aspects:
    • The date on which the spouses separate; and
    • That there is no reasonable prospect that they will resume cohabitation. In other words, there concepts of separation and cohabitation are linked.
  • However, the two concepts, while related, are not interchangeable, i.e.:
    • “Separation” requires more than living under separate roofs, but rather involves a cessation of the “multi-levelled intricate relationship between couples.”
    • Likewise, “cohabitation” implies conjugality.

If a separated couple is not agreed on the exact date on which these two factors were met, a court may have to make the determination for them.  This involves an evaluation of numerous aspects of the relationship and its ending, not to mention the mindset of each spouse.  As the court points out:

Continuation of a relationship requires two people. Either can end the relationship without the consent of the other. As a matter of common sense, there will be many cases where one spouse knows that there will be no reconciliation and the other does not because the one has decided he or she does not wish to reconcile, but the other does not yet understand this. A fair determination of this issue requires that an objective eye be cast upon the unique circumstances of the couple. Thus it is that there are cases where couples are found to have met the test under section 4(1) even though they both continue to live in the matrimonial home….

The court goes on to emphasize that the test under this FLA provision has a clear purpose:

When was it that there was no reasonable prospect that they would resume cohabitation? … In considering this question, it is helpful to keep in mind the purpose for which the question is being asked. It is to set the valuation date, the date at which the parties ceased being one kind of entity for financial purposes – a couple – and became another, a separated couple. Surely it is obvious that there is no one moment in time that can be fixed as the objectively true separation date. Rather the Court should determine the date on which it is fair that the parties no longer share the financial consequences of being married.

Finally, it should be noted that the FLA also allows for the valuation date to be set earlier or later than a couple’s separation date, depending on the circumstances.  The court explains:

Where one spouse with the intention of ending the relationship transfers or dissipates assets, an early valuation date may be appropriate. Where one spouse has decided to terminate the relationship, but has not made this clear to the other spouse, then a valuation date that is later may be in order. However, the test is not purely subjective. Groundless hopes of reconciliation should not extend a valuation date where one spouse has been clear in his or her intentions to end the relationship.

For the full text of the decision, see:

Strobele v. Strobele

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

Could a Couple’s 30-Year-Old Separation Agreement Be Struck Down Now?

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Could a Couple’s 30-Year-Old Separation Agreement Be Struck Down Now?

The couple had been married in 1969, when the woman was 15 years old, and the man was 21 years old.  They had no children.

They decided to divorce in 1985.  A year earlier they had executed a separation agreement, witnessed by their respective lawyers, in which they divided up their matrimonial property and agreed to release their spousal support obligations towards each other.   On that latter issue, they each attested to the fact that: 1) neither of them required spousal support from the other; and 2) they had both considered their present and future financial prospects, and thought the agreement was fair.  It also contained a clause confirming that they each understood their rights and had obtained Independent Legal Advice (ILA) before signing.

All the agreement’s provisions were incorporated into the divorce order they obtained from a court a year later.

Fast forward to 2015, almost 30 years later. The wife brought a motion to have the separation agreement set aside, particularly as it related to her waiver of spousal support.  While she did not recall much about the circumstances all these years later, she claimed that she did not understand the nature of what she was signing at the time.

The court’s first task was to determine which version of the provincial Family Law legislation to apply to that assessment.  The one that had been in force 30 years ago required the wife to show that she had agreed to waive her support right in “circumstances that [were] unconscionable.”   The present-day equivalent, which was the Family Law Act, required only that she show that she did not “understand the nature or the consequences” of the separation agreement.

The court concluded that – using either threshold – the wife had failed to meet the test.

Looking at the evidence that could be provided from both parties, it fell short of showing the wife – who worked as a legal secretary at the time – did not understand the agreement, or appreciate the effect of signing away her support rights.   The rest of the clauses gave her the matrimonial home, the car, and most of the furniture, in a scenario where both of them were working at the time and had no children.   Even looking only at what was in writing, the court noted the spouses had specifically agreed on the fairness and lack of unconscionability of the circumstances.  Both acknowledged receiving ILA in advance.

In fact, the court noted that the wife had actually adhered to the agreement in other respects:   It contained an unusual clause stating that if within stipulated time-frames the wife were to either remarry, sell the home, or die, she would owe the husband $40,000 with interest.  When she did marry another man 7 years after the divorce, she called the husband to tell him she was prepared to honour her obligation under the agreement to pay him the $40,000, and did so during a meeting at a local restaurant.  This helped show that she appreciated the nature of what she had signed overall.

The court concluded:

Based on all of the evidence, I conclude that the parties intended to divide all of their assets, and live separate lives.  Indeed, the parties did just that.  The agreement was not unfair …

Both parties lead lives very separate and apart from each other.  They lived their lives and organized their affairs on the assumption that everything had been divided and resolved.  This understanding survived for decades.

Concluding that it would be unfair to allow either spouse to re-open the terms of this long-ago agreement now, the court dismissed the wife’s motion.

For the full text of the decision, see:

Pipitone v. D’Amelio

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

 

“If Only He’d Have Been Nice to Fluffy”

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“If Only He’d Have Been Nice to Fluffy”

Justice Pazaratz, known for the colourful writing in his family litigation rulings, begins his judgment in a particularly acrimonious custody case this way:

If only he’d been nice to Fluffy.

Sometimes in custody trials it’s the little things — literally — that help judges figure out what’s really going on.

Because believe it or not, judges realize that how people present themselves in affidavits and on the witness stand, is not necessarily how they behave when no one is looking.

Sometimes the little things can speak volumes.

In this case, among the “little things” that the judge referred to a stuffed animal that was dear to the child that the warring parents had together.

The back-story was this: The couple had met when they both worked as flight attendants.  When she unexpectedly became pregnant with his child, they agreed that she would move in with him, but she moved out about 6 weeks later because he was inflexible and domineering with her and with her two older twins from another relationship.  The acrimony continued – and indeed was heightened – in the time following separation, when the parents had numerous conflicts over sharing custody and their different approaches to caring for the child.  They now appeared before Justice Pazaratz to determine who should have sole custody of their 3.5-year-old child (and neither of them was willing to compromise with joint custody or parallel parenting).

Justice Pazaratz chronicled numerous incidents between the couple, with the pervasive theme being the intransigence of the father in his dealings with the mother and their child.  The judge wrote:

FLUFFY

But perhaps the most mind-boggling expression of the [father’s] hostility and defiance toward the [mother] relates to Fluffy: a small, white, stuffed animal [the daughter] became attached to when she was about seven months old. The [mother] testified at length about this — and the [father] didn’t deny any of her allegations.

The first incident occurred in March 2015:

  1. [The daughter] was experiencing separation anxiety when she went on visits with the [father].
  2. So the [mother] said she “negotiated” with [the daughter] that she could take Fluffy with her when she went on visits.
  3. When the [father] arrived at the front of her home to pick [the daughter] up for a visit he immediately pulled Fluffy from [the daughter’s] arm, pushed Fluffy into the [mother’s] face, and told her “I have my own stuffed animals.”
  4. The [mother] testified [the daughter] became hysterical, but the [father] simply left with the child. Fluffy stayed behind.

The second incident occurred in April 2015:

  1. The [wife] sent the [husband] an e-mail explaining that [daughter] was still experiencing separation anxiety and that the child would be bringing Fluffy with her because she found the stuffed animal emotionally reassuring.
  2. However, when the [father] attended at the front of her home to pick [the daughter] up, he again removed Fluffy from the child’s arms, this time throwing Fluffy onto the driveway.
  3. Once again [the daughter] became hysterical. The [father] took her for the visit. The [mother] retrieved Fluffy and went back in her house.

The [mother] testified that later in 2015 they went to court and negotiated a resolution of the Fluffy issue. (Pause for a moment to let that sink in: They went to court to negotiate a Fluffy resolution.) The [father] finally agreed that Fluffy could accompany [the daughter] during visits.

But it turned out to be a pyrrhic victory for common sense.

  1. The [father] developed a new routine:
  2. At the beginning of each visit, when he came to pick up [the daughter], she was allowed to bring Fluffy with her.
  3. But as soon as they got to his car, the [father] tossed Fluffy into his trunk and closed it. They then drove away.
  4. To the [mother’s] knowledge, Fluffy remained in the trunk during the entire visit.
  5. At the end of visits, the [father] retrieved Fluffy from his trunk, and handed the doll back to [the daughter].
  6. I suppose technically Fluffy got to come along for the ride.

But things got even worse for Fluffy.

  1. The [mother] testified that after a while, whenever Fluffy came out of the [father’s] trunk, the little stuffed animal smelled terrible. Fluffy gave off a noxious odor, as if dipped in Vicks VapoRub or camphor oil.
  2. The [mother] said on three occasions she had to wash Fluffy because [the daughter] couldn’t possibly play with a toy which had apparently been doused in an offensive and potentially dangerous substance.
  3. The [mother] e-mailed the [father] asking why he was damaging the child’s prized possession.
  4. The [father] accused her of fabricating a complaint.
  5. The [mother] said she finally gave up and stopped sending Fluffy.

 

I have no idea why the [father] allowed Fluffy to turn into such a major and unwinnable competition.

  1. He doesn’t like the [mother]. I get it.

  1. But Fluffy was just….Fluffy.
  2. Just a harmless little toy of no consequence to anyone….except a vulnerable two year old caught in the middle of a bitter custody dispute.
  3. Would it have killed him to just let the child hang on to her toy?
  4. Was it really necessary to make his daughter cry, just to flex his need for control?
  5. In Coe v. Tope, 2014 ONSC 4002 (Ont. S.C.J.) this court offered some very simple advice for situations like this: Stop acting like you hate your ex more than you love your child.

Despite finding that they were both good parents and both loved the child equally, Justice Pazaratz concluded as follows:

The bottom line: Despite unquestioning love, incredible passion, and impressive credentials — the [father] has given us every reason to worry that if he is granted decision making authority, he will not promote the [wife] in [the daughter’s] life. There is a real danger he will shut the mother out.

In contrast, the [mother] has provided overwhelming reassurance that she has always made good and fair decisions for [the daughter], and she will continue to co-parent with the [father].

Family Court Judges don’t have a crystal ball. We can only go on the basis of how parents have behaved so far.

After reviewing all the circumstances in detailed and lengthy reasons, Justice Pazaratz concluded that it was in child’s best interests that mother be granted sole custody.  And – true to form – he added the following admonishment to the father, at the end of the judgment:

POSTSCRIPT

If only he’d been nice to Fluffy.

If only he’d been nice to the [mother].

If only the [father] had remembered the two magic words of custody cases.

”Be nice.”

For the full text of the decision, see:

Chomos v Hamilton

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

Can Bankrupt Wife Still Claim for Equalization of NFP?

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Can Bankrupt Wife Still Claim for Equalization of NFP?

If a spouse declares bankruptcy, is he or she then prevented from claiming for equalization of Net Family Property (NFP?) under Ontario Family law?

That was the question in Kinsella v. Mills, which involved a couple who had separated after 7 years of marriage. At that point, they signed Minutes of Settlement that finalized the splitting of their financial affairs, which was intended to deal with all issues including spousal support, equalization of NFP and constructive trust claims.  The Settlement reflected the couple’s agreement that the husband would take sole ownership of the matrimonial home and assume all debts and costs, and in return would pay the wife an agreed lump sum, together with a monthly amount.

Less than a year later, the wife declared bankruptcy.  She was automatically discharged nine months later.  The couple’s divorce was formalized a few months after that.

The wife then applied to the court to set aside that Settlement, claiming that it was unfair, signed under duress, and in a situation where she had no independent legal advice and did not know what she was signing. If she was successful, the wife planned to re-launch her claim for equalization of NFP, and wanted it divided unequally in her favour.

The husband resisted, pointing out that after the marriage breakdown he was left with a large amount of debt.  Because of the wife’s bankruptcy, she was released from having to pay it, but he was still saddled with debt that they had rung up together.  Nothing about the Settlement was unfair, in his view.

The court was asked to make a ruling.  It observed that nothing in the Family Law Act or the federal Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act  specifically prevents a spouse from making a claim for equalization of NFP after declaring bankruptcy. However, after examining the interplay between the two, the court concluded that the legislation operated to effectively do so.  The court noted the following:

  • The wife’s claim to any equalization payment from husband fell within the very broad definition of “property” under the bankruptcy legislation.
  • The moment she declared bankruptcy, she was no longer entitled to dispose of or otherwise deal with her property. Instead, it immediately vested in the bankruptcy trustee.
  • Once any equalization claim vested with the trustee – and unless the trustee actually joined the wife in the Family Law proceeding – the wife’s hands were tied.

The court added that this impasse be remedied by the wife being discharged as a bankrupt, but getting the trustee’s consent to go forward, or by firing the trustee.  The Family Court also had no authority to undo the wife’s bankruptcy.

Having found the wife to lack the capacity to bring the equalization claim, the court added that the Settlement itself was not subject to being undone, since there was no evidence of duress.  The wife had also failed to obtain legal advice before signing it, despite being encouraged to do so.

For the full text of the decision, see:

Kinsella v. Mills

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

If You are Divorced in a Foreign Country, Can a Canadian Court Make Orders Too?

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If You are Divorced in a Foreign Country, Can a Canadian Court Make Orders Too?

The facts in Cheng v. Liu are a little unusual, but the core question was this:

If a couple’s divorce is validly granted outside of Canada by a foreign court, does this preclude a Canadian court from later making any corollary orders – such as rulings on issues of support or custody – arising from that same divorce?

The husband, an engineer, was a Canadian citizen who lived in Canada.  The wife lived in China and had never been to Canada.  They got married in China in 2006 and had a daughter who lived with the wife in China her entire life.  They separated about a year after getting married, in around late 2007 or early 2008.

The wife then covered all the legal bases:  She applied in China for a divorce, and custody of their child.  She also applied in Canadian, under the federal Divorce Act, to ask for a divorce, as well as spousal support, child support, and custody.  Finally, also in Canada under the Ontario Family Law Act, she asked for equalization of net family property.

Meanwhile, the Chinese court granted the wife her divorce and awarded her sole custody of the child.  The wife’s other Ontario-based claims were still pending.

The husband, faced with all of these competing actions requiring his response, asked the Ontario court to suspend (or “stay”) the proceedings so that the entire matter could be determined in China.  This led to several rulings and some procedural wrangling, and ultimately a hearing before the Ontario Court of Appeal for its determination.

Against this complicated background the Ontario Court of Appeal had a simple question to consider:  In light of the Chinese divorce order, could a Canadian court make additional orders relating to child support, spousal support, and equalization of property?

The Court’s conclusion was mixed:  The divorce-related issues were closed for consideration, but the child support issues were still up for an Ontario Family court to rule on.

On the first point – and based on longstanding precedent that considered the provisions of the federal Divorce Act – the law states that once the foreign Chinese court had made a valid divorce order, this removes the authority of the Ontario court to hear and determine corollary matters.  So on the remaining divorce-related issues, the Ontario court had no authority.

However, the situation under the provincial Family Law Act was different:  the Ontario court could still rule on questions relating to child support, since the foreign court in China had not already done so in its divorce order.   The Family Law Act allowed child support claims to be made even after a divorce, and the foreign divorce order had no impact on that.  Indeed, the whole purpose for the Ontario legislation was to ensure that parents provide financial support for their dependent children.  Allowing the Ontario court to continuing to make orders under the Family Law Act even though the Divorce Act provisions had been trumped was actually a harmonious outcome to ensure child support would be covered.

For the full text of the decision, see:

Cheng v. Liu

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

 

Thinking of Doing Some Cyber-Sleuthing? Think Again

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Thinking of Doing Some Cyber-Sleuthing? Think Again

I wrote a recent Blog about the admissibility of surreptitiously-recorded telephone conversations in Family law proceedings.  I have also written several times on how courts approach the admission of Facebook evidence.

Particularly in nasty divorce and custody disputes, it is likely that courts will have to grapple with these kinds of issues regularly, given how easy its become for spouses to try to secretly gather evidence against each other, using a Smartphone, keystroke logger, spyware, etc.

But for the average embattled spouse locked in bitter litigation, how effective is this as an evidence-gathering mechanism for use in Family court?

The answer:  Not very.

Under Canadian law, secretly-gathered computer data, emails, internet history, video, audio and similar evidence is generally not admissible in routine Family law hearings, except in unusual circumstances and only after a court has held a separate mini-hearing, called a voir dire, on the specific issue.  Overall, the odds are not very good that such evidence will be admitted.

Case in point:  In a called T. (T.) v. J.(T.) the court considered a situation where the husband had hacked into his wife’s private email, using the password she had allowed him to have when the marriage was in happier times.   The emails disclosed what was, in the court’s words, “an arguably disturbing exchange between [the wife] and her lawyer, which could be interpreted as evidencing some potential risk or threat to his safety.”  Still, the court found the husband’s email hacking was not only unjustified, it was a clear violation of the wife’s privacy rights.  The court also concluded that the email evidence irrelevant and inadmissible.

Similarly, in a decision in U. (A.J.) v. U. (G.S.) the court considered whether to admit evidence that the husband had collected through the use of spyware he had illegally installed on his former wife’s laptop.  The evidence showed the wife’s activities on internet chat rooms, and established that she had engaged in extra-marital sex.  The court examined the issue in the context of the couple’s dispute over custody and access issues, ultimately concluding that the affair and the online activity was out-of-character for the wife, and was not reflective of her ability to parent the children of the marriage.  The court added that it would be “a rare case” that illegally-obtained evidence should be admitted, and only after the trial judge holds a hearing to determine its admissibility.  The burden was always on the party seeking to enter such evidence to establish “a compelling reason to do so.”

For the full text of the decisions, see:

(A.J.) v. U. (G.S.)

(T.) v. J. (T.)

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

 

Custody Battle Gone Very Wrong:  Mom’s Cellphone Tracker Shows How Misguided Dad Really Is

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Custody Battle Gone Very Wrong:  Mom’s Cellphone Tracker Shows How Misguided Dad Really Is

I have reported previously about a case called M.M.B. (V.) v. C.M.V., the background facts of which are not terribly unique:  After their split in 2013 the parents had agreed to a “parallel parenting” and equal-time arrangement for their three children.  The mother now claimed that in the time since, the father had been engaging in a concerted effort to alienate her from them.  She asked for sole custody and an order that the father undergo therapy.

What’s more noteworthy is the rather epic court ruling in their case, which spanned over 1200 paragraphs, where the court recounted a dizzying array of tactics by each of the parents; overwhelmingly, however, the ruling focused on the misconduct of the father, who the court repeatedly noted had viewed himself as being “in a war” with his former spouse and determined to “win” at all costs.

Among the many accusations of rather mind-boggling misconduct on his part, one of the more interesting ones involved him using an app installed on the mother’s own cell phone to “track” her location.  As the court explained the gist of the mother’s testimony:

During the last two years of the relationship prior to separation, her evidence is that the [father] became more volatile and threw things at or near her. The [mother] testified that he was obsessed with the idea that she was having an affair. Her evidence is that she had never had an affair during the marriage.

 She further testified that the [father] had a constant need to be “in control” and that he utilized a feature on her cell phone to be able to track her whereabouts. Two examples that she cited were, on one occasion when she attended at a lawyer’s office in July 2011, he telephoned her four times during her appointment with the lawyer, knowing exactly where she was at the time. The second example she gave happened in August 2011. They were in New York for a few days and she left early to return to school. While the [mother] was still in New York, she claims that he was able to track her whereabouts and knew that she had taken a different route home. She says that she did so in order to look at possible housing for her and the children. He accused her that she was travelling to a residence for purposes of having an affair.

 As further proof that he was tracking her whereabouts through her cell phone, she indicated that she, as a result of these situations, learned that there was a “track my phone” feature on her phone which she then disabled. Shortly thereafter, however, she testified that he insisted on having her cell phone for some unrelated purpose. When he returned it to her she noticed that that the tracker had been reconnected. …

 When asked about the allegation of tracking the [mother] on her cell phone, his explanation for his knowledge of her going to a lawyer is that their cleaning lady told him this in July 2011 when the [mother] was going to the lawyer.

 When asked about the feature of “find my phone” so that he could allegedly track her whereabouts from his phone, he has a very “plausible” explanation. He claims that because he was using his phone for Association work they jointly downloaded this app so that she would be able to find his phone in the event that he lost it.

 Regarding the knowledge that he had that the [mother] was on a different route on the way home from New York City, the [father] once again has a “plausible” explanation. His brother who is a real estate agent, by happenstance, was showing a house across the road from where the [mother] was driving. His brother took it upon himself to call the [father] to report that he had seen his vehicle, thinking that it was the [father] but of course it was the [mother].

 This court views each of these explanations with a great deal of cynicism.

That cynicism was borne from many other conflicting and incredible explanations by the father, including one piece of “smoking gun” evidence noted by the court several hundred paragraphs later:

In response to the [mother’s] concern that the [father] was tracking her and the children’s whereabouts, the [father’s] response is somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, he “denied this” and stated that he “doesn’t care where she goes”. On the other hand, on several occasions, he admitted to “wanting to locate the children and not her”, which he believes to be a safety issue. He said he ”was able to locate the children by their cell phone devices”.

 This was an admission by the [father] that the court finds is consistent with the evidence given by the [mother] at trial; that she knew that the [father] was tracking her movements through her cell phone. The court finds that this is inconsistent with the [father’s] “explanations” of how he knew the [mother’s] whereabouts on two separate occasions at about the time of the separation. He specifically denied under oath at trial that he was tracking her whereabouts through her cell phone. Undoubtedly, he had forgotten what he said during the assessment, or did not expect this court would take the time to read all of the exhibits.

Particularly as it relates to the father’s highly misguided win-at-all-costs focus, the M.M.B. (V.) v. C.M.V. decision is a virtual judicial textbook on “How Not to Behave” in the post-separation phase.  It could be interesting reading for those who can get through the 1,200-paragraph judgment.

For the full-text of the decision, see

M.M.B. (V.) v. C.M.V.

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com