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Posts from the ‘Separation’ Category

“If Only He’d Have Been Nice to Fluffy”

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“If Only He’d Have Been Nice to Fluffy”

Justice Pazaratz, known for the colourful writing in his family litigation rulings, begins his judgment in a particularly acrimonious custody case this way:

If only he’d been nice to Fluffy.

Sometimes in custody trials it’s the little things — literally — that help judges figure out what’s really going on.

Because believe it or not, judges realize that how people present themselves in affidavits and on the witness stand, is not necessarily how they behave when no one is looking.

Sometimes the little things can speak volumes.

In this case, among the “little things” that the judge referred to a stuffed animal that was dear to the child that the warring parents had together.

The back-story was this: The couple had met when they both worked as flight attendants.  When she unexpectedly became pregnant with his child, they agreed that she would move in with him, but she moved out about 6 weeks later because he was inflexible and domineering with her and with her two older twins from another relationship.  The acrimony continued – and indeed was heightened – in the time following separation, when the parents had numerous conflicts over sharing custody and their different approaches to caring for the child.  They now appeared before Justice Pazaratz to determine who should have sole custody of their 3.5-year-old child (and neither of them was willing to compromise with joint custody or parallel parenting).

Justice Pazaratz chronicled numerous incidents between the couple, with the pervasive theme being the intransigence of the father in his dealings with the mother and their child.  The judge wrote:

FLUFFY

But perhaps the most mind-boggling expression of the [father’s] hostility and defiance toward the [mother] relates to Fluffy: a small, white, stuffed animal [the daughter] became attached to when she was about seven months old. The [mother] testified at length about this — and the [father] didn’t deny any of her allegations.

The first incident occurred in March 2015:

  1. [The daughter] was experiencing separation anxiety when she went on visits with the [father].
  2. So the [mother] said she “negotiated” with [the daughter] that she could take Fluffy with her when she went on visits.
  3. When the [father] arrived at the front of her home to pick [the daughter] up for a visit he immediately pulled Fluffy from [the daughter’s] arm, pushed Fluffy into the [mother’s] face, and told her “I have my own stuffed animals.”
  4. The [mother] testified [the daughter] became hysterical, but the [father] simply left with the child. Fluffy stayed behind.

The second incident occurred in April 2015:

  1. The [wife] sent the [husband] an e-mail explaining that [daughter] was still experiencing separation anxiety and that the child would be bringing Fluffy with her because she found the stuffed animal emotionally reassuring.
  2. However, when the [father] attended at the front of her home to pick [the daughter] up, he again removed Fluffy from the child’s arms, this time throwing Fluffy onto the driveway.
  3. Once again [the daughter] became hysterical. The [father] took her for the visit. The [mother] retrieved Fluffy and went back in her house.

The [mother] testified that later in 2015 they went to court and negotiated a resolution of the Fluffy issue. (Pause for a moment to let that sink in: They went to court to negotiate a Fluffy resolution.) The [father] finally agreed that Fluffy could accompany [the daughter] during visits.

But it turned out to be a pyrrhic victory for common sense.

  1. The [father] developed a new routine:
  2. At the beginning of each visit, when he came to pick up [the daughter], she was allowed to bring Fluffy with her.
  3. But as soon as they got to his car, the [father] tossed Fluffy into his trunk and closed it. They then drove away.
  4. To the [mother’s] knowledge, Fluffy remained in the trunk during the entire visit.
  5. At the end of visits, the [father] retrieved Fluffy from his trunk, and handed the doll back to [the daughter].
  6. I suppose technically Fluffy got to come along for the ride.

But things got even worse for Fluffy.

  1. The [mother] testified that after a while, whenever Fluffy came out of the [father’s] trunk, the little stuffed animal smelled terrible. Fluffy gave off a noxious odor, as if dipped in Vicks VapoRub or camphor oil.
  2. The [mother] said on three occasions she had to wash Fluffy because [the daughter] couldn’t possibly play with a toy which had apparently been doused in an offensive and potentially dangerous substance.
  3. The [mother] e-mailed the [father] asking why he was damaging the child’s prized possession.
  4. The [father] accused her of fabricating a complaint.
  5. The [mother] said she finally gave up and stopped sending Fluffy.

 

I have no idea why the [father] allowed Fluffy to turn into such a major and unwinnable competition.

  1. He doesn’t like the [mother]. I get it.

  1. But Fluffy was just….Fluffy.
  2. Just a harmless little toy of no consequence to anyone….except a vulnerable two year old caught in the middle of a bitter custody dispute.
  3. Would it have killed him to just let the child hang on to her toy?
  4. Was it really necessary to make his daughter cry, just to flex his need for control?
  5. In Coe v. Tope, 2014 ONSC 4002 (Ont. S.C.J.) this court offered some very simple advice for situations like this: Stop acting like you hate your ex more than you love your child.

Despite finding that they were both good parents and both loved the child equally, Justice Pazaratz concluded as follows:

The bottom line: Despite unquestioning love, incredible passion, and impressive credentials — the [father] has given us every reason to worry that if he is granted decision making authority, he will not promote the [wife] in [the daughter’s] life. There is a real danger he will shut the mother out.

In contrast, the [mother] has provided overwhelming reassurance that she has always made good and fair decisions for [the daughter], and she will continue to co-parent with the [father].

Family Court Judges don’t have a crystal ball. We can only go on the basis of how parents have behaved so far.

After reviewing all the circumstances in detailed and lengthy reasons, Justice Pazaratz concluded that it was in child’s best interests that mother be granted sole custody.  And – true to form – he added the following admonishment to the father, at the end of the judgment:

POSTSCRIPT

If only he’d been nice to Fluffy.

If only he’d been nice to the [mother].

If only the [father] had remembered the two magic words of custody cases.

”Be nice.”

For the full text of the decision, see:

Chomos v Hamilton

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

Can Bankrupt Wife Still Claim for Equalization of NFP?

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Can Bankrupt Wife Still Claim for Equalization of NFP?

If a spouse declares bankruptcy, is he or she then prevented from claiming for equalization of Net Family Property (NFP?) under Ontario Family law?

That was the question in Kinsella v. Mills, which involved a couple who had separated after 7 years of marriage. At that point, they signed Minutes of Settlement that finalized the splitting of their financial affairs, which was intended to deal with all issues including spousal support, equalization of NFP and constructive trust claims.  The Settlement reflected the couple’s agreement that the husband would take sole ownership of the matrimonial home and assume all debts and costs, and in return would pay the wife an agreed lump sum, together with a monthly amount.

Less than a year later, the wife declared bankruptcy.  She was automatically discharged nine months later.  The couple’s divorce was formalized a few months after that.

The wife then applied to the court to set aside that Settlement, claiming that it was unfair, signed under duress, and in a situation where she had no independent legal advice and did not know what she was signing. If she was successful, the wife planned to re-launch her claim for equalization of NFP, and wanted it divided unequally in her favour.

The husband resisted, pointing out that after the marriage breakdown he was left with a large amount of debt.  Because of the wife’s bankruptcy, she was released from having to pay it, but he was still saddled with debt that they had rung up together.  Nothing about the Settlement was unfair, in his view.

The court was asked to make a ruling.  It observed that nothing in the Family Law Act or the federal Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act  specifically prevents a spouse from making a claim for equalization of NFP after declaring bankruptcy. However, after examining the interplay between the two, the court concluded that the legislation operated to effectively do so.  The court noted the following:

  • The wife’s claim to any equalization payment from husband fell within the very broad definition of “property” under the bankruptcy legislation.
  • The moment she declared bankruptcy, she was no longer entitled to dispose of or otherwise deal with her property. Instead, it immediately vested in the bankruptcy trustee.
  • Once any equalization claim vested with the trustee – and unless the trustee actually joined the wife in the Family Law proceeding – the wife’s hands were tied.

The court added that this impasse be remedied by the wife being discharged as a bankrupt, but getting the trustee’s consent to go forward, or by firing the trustee.  The Family Court also had no authority to undo the wife’s bankruptcy.

Having found the wife to lack the capacity to bring the equalization claim, the court added that the Settlement itself was not subject to being undone, since there was no evidence of duress.  The wife had also failed to obtain legal advice before signing it, despite being encouraged to do so.

For the full text of the decision, see:

Kinsella v. Mills

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

If You are Divorced in a Foreign Country, Can a Canadian Court Make Orders Too?

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If You are Divorced in a Foreign Country, Can a Canadian Court Make Orders Too?

The facts in Cheng v. Liu are a little unusual, but the core question was this:

If a couple’s divorce is validly granted outside of Canada by a foreign court, does this preclude a Canadian court from later making any corollary orders – such as rulings on issues of support or custody – arising from that same divorce?

The husband, an engineer, was a Canadian citizen who lived in Canada.  The wife lived in China and had never been to Canada.  They got married in China in 2006 and had a daughter who lived with the wife in China her entire life.  They separated about a year after getting married, in around late 2007 or early 2008.

The wife then covered all the legal bases:  She applied in China for a divorce, and custody of their child.  She also applied in Canadian, under the federal Divorce Act, to ask for a divorce, as well as spousal support, child support, and custody.  Finally, also in Canada under the Ontario Family Law Act, she asked for equalization of net family property.

Meanwhile, the Chinese court granted the wife her divorce and awarded her sole custody of the child.  The wife’s other Ontario-based claims were still pending.

The husband, faced with all of these competing actions requiring his response, asked the Ontario court to suspend (or “stay”) the proceedings so that the entire matter could be determined in China.  This led to several rulings and some procedural wrangling, and ultimately a hearing before the Ontario Court of Appeal for its determination.

Against this complicated background the Ontario Court of Appeal had a simple question to consider:  In light of the Chinese divorce order, could a Canadian court make additional orders relating to child support, spousal support, and equalization of property?

The Court’s conclusion was mixed:  The divorce-related issues were closed for consideration, but the child support issues were still up for an Ontario Family court to rule on.

On the first point – and based on longstanding precedent that considered the provisions of the federal Divorce Act – the law states that once the foreign Chinese court had made a valid divorce order, this removes the authority of the Ontario court to hear and determine corollary matters.  So on the remaining divorce-related issues, the Ontario court had no authority.

However, the situation under the provincial Family Law Act was different:  the Ontario court could still rule on questions relating to child support, since the foreign court in China had not already done so in its divorce order.   The Family Law Act allowed child support claims to be made even after a divorce, and the foreign divorce order had no impact on that.  Indeed, the whole purpose for the Ontario legislation was to ensure that parents provide financial support for their dependent children.  Allowing the Ontario court to continuing to make orders under the Family Law Act even though the Divorce Act provisions had been trumped was actually a harmonious outcome to ensure child support would be covered.

For the full text of the decision, see:

Cheng v. Liu

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

 

Thinking of Doing Some Cyber-Sleuthing? Think Again

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Thinking of Doing Some Cyber-Sleuthing? Think Again

I wrote a recent Blog about the admissibility of surreptitiously-recorded telephone conversations in Family law proceedings.  I have also written several times on how courts approach the admission of Facebook evidence.

Particularly in nasty divorce and custody disputes, it is likely that courts will have to grapple with these kinds of issues regularly, given how easy its become for spouses to try to secretly gather evidence against each other, using a Smartphone, keystroke logger, spyware, etc.

But for the average embattled spouse locked in bitter litigation, how effective is this as an evidence-gathering mechanism for use in Family court?

The answer:  Not very.

Under Canadian law, secretly-gathered computer data, emails, internet history, video, audio and similar evidence is generally not admissible in routine Family law hearings, except in unusual circumstances and only after a court has held a separate mini-hearing, called a voir dire, on the specific issue.  Overall, the odds are not very good that such evidence will be admitted.

Case in point:  In a called T. (T.) v. J.(T.) the court considered a situation where the husband had hacked into his wife’s private email, using the password she had allowed him to have when the marriage was in happier times.   The emails disclosed what was, in the court’s words, “an arguably disturbing exchange between [the wife] and her lawyer, which could be interpreted as evidencing some potential risk or threat to his safety.”  Still, the court found the husband’s email hacking was not only unjustified, it was a clear violation of the wife’s privacy rights.  The court also concluded that the email evidence irrelevant and inadmissible.

Similarly, in a decision in U. (A.J.) v. U. (G.S.) the court considered whether to admit evidence that the husband had collected through the use of spyware he had illegally installed on his former wife’s laptop.  The evidence showed the wife’s activities on internet chat rooms, and established that she had engaged in extra-marital sex.  The court examined the issue in the context of the couple’s dispute over custody and access issues, ultimately concluding that the affair and the online activity was out-of-character for the wife, and was not reflective of her ability to parent the children of the marriage.  The court added that it would be “a rare case” that illegally-obtained evidence should be admitted, and only after the trial judge holds a hearing to determine its admissibility.  The burden was always on the party seeking to enter such evidence to establish “a compelling reason to do so.”

For the full text of the decisions, see:

(A.J.) v. U. (G.S.)

(T.) v. J. (T.)

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

 

Custody Battle Gone Very Wrong:  Mom’s Cellphone Tracker Shows How Misguided Dad Really Is

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Custody Battle Gone Very Wrong:  Mom’s Cellphone Tracker Shows How Misguided Dad Really Is

I have reported previously about a case called M.M.B. (V.) v. C.M.V., the background facts of which are not terribly unique:  After their split in 2013 the parents had agreed to a “parallel parenting” and equal-time arrangement for their three children.  The mother now claimed that in the time since, the father had been engaging in a concerted effort to alienate her from them.  She asked for sole custody and an order that the father undergo therapy.

What’s more noteworthy is the rather epic court ruling in their case, which spanned over 1200 paragraphs, where the court recounted a dizzying array of tactics by each of the parents; overwhelmingly, however, the ruling focused on the misconduct of the father, who the court repeatedly noted had viewed himself as being “in a war” with his former spouse and determined to “win” at all costs.

Among the many accusations of rather mind-boggling misconduct on his part, one of the more interesting ones involved him using an app installed on the mother’s own cell phone to “track” her location.  As the court explained the gist of the mother’s testimony:

During the last two years of the relationship prior to separation, her evidence is that the [father] became more volatile and threw things at or near her. The [mother] testified that he was obsessed with the idea that she was having an affair. Her evidence is that she had never had an affair during the marriage.

 She further testified that the [father] had a constant need to be “in control” and that he utilized a feature on her cell phone to be able to track her whereabouts. Two examples that she cited were, on one occasion when she attended at a lawyer’s office in July 2011, he telephoned her four times during her appointment with the lawyer, knowing exactly where she was at the time. The second example she gave happened in August 2011. They were in New York for a few days and she left early to return to school. While the [mother] was still in New York, she claims that he was able to track her whereabouts and knew that she had taken a different route home. She says that she did so in order to look at possible housing for her and the children. He accused her that she was travelling to a residence for purposes of having an affair.

 As further proof that he was tracking her whereabouts through her cell phone, she indicated that she, as a result of these situations, learned that there was a “track my phone” feature on her phone which she then disabled. Shortly thereafter, however, she testified that he insisted on having her cell phone for some unrelated purpose. When he returned it to her she noticed that that the tracker had been reconnected. …

 When asked about the allegation of tracking the [mother] on her cell phone, his explanation for his knowledge of her going to a lawyer is that their cleaning lady told him this in July 2011 when the [mother] was going to the lawyer.

 When asked about the feature of “find my phone” so that he could allegedly track her whereabouts from his phone, he has a very “plausible” explanation. He claims that because he was using his phone for Association work they jointly downloaded this app so that she would be able to find his phone in the event that he lost it.

 Regarding the knowledge that he had that the [mother] was on a different route on the way home from New York City, the [father] once again has a “plausible” explanation. His brother who is a real estate agent, by happenstance, was showing a house across the road from where the [mother] was driving. His brother took it upon himself to call the [father] to report that he had seen his vehicle, thinking that it was the [father] but of course it was the [mother].

 This court views each of these explanations with a great deal of cynicism.

That cynicism was borne from many other conflicting and incredible explanations by the father, including one piece of “smoking gun” evidence noted by the court several hundred paragraphs later:

In response to the [mother’s] concern that the [father] was tracking her and the children’s whereabouts, the [father’s] response is somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, he “denied this” and stated that he “doesn’t care where she goes”. On the other hand, on several occasions, he admitted to “wanting to locate the children and not her”, which he believes to be a safety issue. He said he ”was able to locate the children by their cell phone devices”.

 This was an admission by the [father] that the court finds is consistent with the evidence given by the [mother] at trial; that she knew that the [father] was tracking her movements through her cell phone. The court finds that this is inconsistent with the [father’s] “explanations” of how he knew the [mother’s] whereabouts on two separate occasions at about the time of the separation. He specifically denied under oath at trial that he was tracking her whereabouts through her cell phone. Undoubtedly, he had forgotten what he said during the assessment, or did not expect this court would take the time to read all of the exhibits.

Particularly as it relates to the father’s highly misguided win-at-all-costs focus, the M.M.B. (V.) v. C.M.V. decision is a virtual judicial textbook on “How Not to Behave” in the post-separation phase.  It could be interesting reading for those who can get through the 1,200-paragraph judgment.

For the full-text of the decision, see

M.M.B. (V.) v. C.M.V.

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

 

 

A Day in the Life:  Court Uses “Ladder” Metaphor to Get Through to Firefighter Dad

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A Day in the Life:  Court Uses “Ladder” Metaphor to Get Through to Firefighter Dad

In an upcoming blog about an Ontario court decision in which the court was tasked with sorting out a particularly acrimonious, high-conflict separation and divorce between couple.  The result was a written court ruling that took up more than 1,200 paragraphs.

Obviously, the court had quite a lot to say.  And what was especially noteworthy was the court’s attempt to “get through to” the parents in a manner that they will understand.

The court prefaces that unusually-lengthy ruling with the following comments:

In addition, of course, to the monies spent by the parties, there has been an incredible expenditure of community resources in an attempt to address the conflict this family faces.

The financial cost is just one aspect of the damage done to this family.

The emotional cost to the parties, and in particular to the children, is something that cannot be quantified.

This court heard fourteen days of trial.

This court, at the risk of being accused of being delusional or blinded by eternal optimism, has crafted a decision pursuant to which the court is optimistic that the respondent father’s mentality can be changed from one of “war” as it has been described until now, to one in which the objective is changed from “winning” and “destroying” the other parent to one in which the objective is to have an environment pursuant to which the children can be free to love both parents and can freely move back and forth between them willingly, happily and without the need for the intervention of any of the resources earlier referred to.

This court is not naïve and does not expect that that will occur overnight but on the other hand, this court believes that if it did not try to create that situation it would have let these children down and simply “given up” on them. This court is not prepared to do that.

The court’s next step was to comment on the approach taken by each of the parents throughout the protracted litigation, first to castigate the father, and then to laud the mother. About the father, the court used a metaphor that it hoped would resonate with the father, writing:

As will be seen in this judgment, this court has found that the respondent father has engaged in a “war” as two witnesses have indicated he characterized it at the beginning. The respondent of course denies that he said this but his actions speak far louder than any words that he could have uttered.

The respondent is an acting District Fire Chief and therefore the court has found it appropriate to use a word picture involving a ladder, being a piece of equipment associated with firefighting.

This court finds that the respondent has climbed a ladder and reached the top almost realizing his perceived goal. That goal was to have control over the children and to be in a situation where the mother of those children, being a mother whom he chose for them, was totally marginalized. He almost achieved that goal in that the children at their current ages have each expressed that they do not wish at the current time to have any meaningful relationship with their mother, nor to spend time with her on a regular basis.

This court hopes that the respondent father will see, as this court sees so clearly, that the wall that his ladder should have been against, and the wall that hopefully he will climb after he climbs down from this current ladder is one in which at the top of the wall is a situation whereby the children have a healthy relationship with both parents and can freely love each of them without feeling any guilt towards the other. Love is not a finite quantity pursuant to which if you give love to one of your parents you must take it away from the other. In fact, the children can also love the respondent father’s girlfriend as a “stepmother” without having to feel that by doing so they need to thereby not love their biological mother.

In contrast was the mother’s conduct throughout, which the court found was praise-worthy overall:

This court would be remiss if, in its summary of this case, it did not comment on the applicant mother. This court finds, as with any parent, the applicant mother is far from perfect. In fact, some of her actions, likely taken out of fear of losing her children, exacerbated the situation. This court finds that her parenting style is far more structured than that of the respondent father which “played into” his desire to alienate the children from their mother.

Having said that, the applicant mother has been subjected to not only emotionally abusive treatment from the respondent father and those under his “control” but emotionally and even physically abusive behavior from the children. The court does not “blame” the children as, there is an obvious reason why they are behaving in the manner in which they are behaving.

Many, and in fact probably most, mothers even those who deeply love their children would have “thrown in the towel” by now, but the applicant mother did not. That, this court finds, is not only to her credit but will be something that this court anticipates in years to come will be greatly appreciated by her children.

With that preface to the subsequent 1,200 paragraph’s worth of specific rulings designed to resolve the couple’s dispute, the court added – perhaps optimistically – that:

… this court has crafted a decision that it believes is one that could result in a 180° change being made in their lives from one of adversarial conflict between their parents, the extended families, and unfortunately the children themselves and their mother, to one in which they are allowed once again to “be children” and not have to constantly be concerned about the conflict between their parents.

The court’s stated objective is a good one, and it applies with equal pertinence to anyone embroiled in family litigation involving custody and access issues.

For the full text of the decision, see:

M.M.B. (V.) v C.M.V.

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

 

 

 

Can You Sue a Cheater for Damages?

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Can You Sue a Cheater for Damages?

These days, not a week goes by without some sort of sexual scandal in the news. Recently, it has focused on allegations of sexual harassment by prominent figures and celebrities but this merely adds to usual crop adultery-scandal coverage that routinely graces the cover of magazines seen while waiting in the check-out line.

I was reminded of an older Family Law decision the other day, which considered the question of whether one person can sue another for cheating on them, or for falsely promising to marry them or have an exclusive relationship with them.

The decision in Lee v. Riley raised exactly this scenario.  The matter came before the court the initially to consider whether the lawsuit actually raised any valid legal claims.  (Under Canadian law, this process serves as a preliminary “screening mechanism” for weeding out those claims adjudged to be entirely without merit, so as not to waste the court’s time (and the taxpayers’ money) on frivolous or otherwise untenable lawsuits.   The prevailing test at the time was whether it is “plain and obvious” that the cause of action cannot succeed.)

In Lee v. Riley the woman had sued the man for what has a rather novel claim.  As the court put it:

The plaintiff [woman] alleges that the defendant [man] failed to advise her that he was involved with another women whom he later married while he was carrying on an intimate relationships with her within a context of an apparent ongoing developing relationship. When she discovered the truth, the [woman] claims that she became ill and has suffered damages. The [woman] asserts a number of causes of action arising out of these facts, including assault, intentional infliction of mental suffering, and fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation.

Although it appeared to have sympathy for the woman, the court dismissed her claim outright, having found no supportable, legal cause of action in her pleadings.  The court wrote:

The [man’s] conduct, as alleged, is morally reprehensible and disgraceful. Nevertheless, the law has never punished either criminally or in civil proceedings, the untruths, half-truths and other inducement which accompany seduction, absent a fraudulent relationship or the presence of a known serious transmittable disease. The [woman] knew who the [man] was and knew the [illegible text] sexual acts being undertaken. The law cannot protect every person against the kind of behaviour the [man[allegedly manifested. Relationships involve risk-taking. People should be honest but it is well known that frequently they are not.

What are your thoughts?  Are there circumstances where the law should recognized a claim in damage by the cheated-on partner?

For the full text of the decision, see:

Lee v. Riley, 2002 CarswellOnt 5558

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

 

 

 

Moving with a Child: Mother’s Views Take a Back Seat to “Super ordinate Considerations” Affecting Child

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Moving with a Child: Mother’s Views Take a Back Seat to “Super ordinate Considerations” Affecting Child

In cases where spouses are separated or divorced, the decision of where a parent can live and work is no longer his or her alone.   Rather, the Family Court may become involved, and may be asked to give the parent permission to relocate, particularly if that involves moving with the child to a faraway community or jurisdiction, such that convenient access by the other parent is foreclosed.

Recently I talked about a noteworthy decision in a case called Porter v. Bryan where the Ontario Court of Appeal considered the various interests that must be considered when granting (or denying) permission in such cases.

In identifying those factors, the Court drew from a decision by the Supreme Court of Canada in a landmark case called Gordon v. Goertz, where the country’s top Court said:

…the views of the custodial parent, who lives with the child and is charged with making decisions in its interest on a day-to-day basis, are entitled to great respect and the most serious consideration. The decision of the custodial parent to live and work where he or she chooses is likewise entitled to respect, barring an improper motive reflecting adversely on the custodial parent’s parenting ability.

However, while the custodial parent’s views are entitled to “serious consideration,” and were part of a balancing of the two parents’ competing interests as well, it was actually the child’s best interests that were to be given what the court called “superordinate consideration”, with the entire analysis to be determined using a child-centred perspective.   This was in line with the Court’s own prior ruling in a case called Berry v. Berry as well.

Applying these principles to the fact situation in Porter v. Bryan:   While the mother’s reasons for moving – while entitled to “great respect” – were relevant only to the extent that they related to her ability to meet the needs of her son.   The overall focus was to remain – at all times – on what was in the best interests of the child.

For the full text of the decisions, see:

Berry v. Berry

Porter v. Bryan

Gordon v. Goertz

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

If the Wife Goes to Stay with Her Mother – Does the “Clock” on their Relationship Start Over?

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If the Wife Goes to Stay with Her Mother – Does the “Clock” on their Relationship Start Over?

In Whalen-Byrne v. Byrne, the issue for the family court seemed simple enough: It was to determine the precise duration of the former couple’s relationship, which in turn would drive the duration of spousal support the husband had been adjudged to owe the wife.

And the beginning and end dates were uncontentious:  both husband and wife agreed that they began living together in 1993, and separated in 2010, which on a straightforward calculation was a span of 17 years.

But the problem was that at one point – from October 1996 to March 1997 – the wife moved out of the matrimonial home and went to stay with her mother.    After this brief separation they reconciled, and went on to get married a few years later.

The court was therefore left to determine what effect this separation had on the duration of their union.  A trial court had pegged it to be 13 years, on the basis that the separation essentially “restarted the clock” on their relationship, and that it really only commenced to run after they reconciled.  The trial judge explained it this way:

It appears that following the [wife] moving in with her mother the parties continued to be open to the possibility of continuing a relationship; however, both parties were taking steps to put distance between themselves (i.e. cessation of cohabitation and pursuit of relationships with other persons other than the other party). The most reasonable interpretation is that the parties intended to be separate from one another subject, at best, to the possibility of resumption of cohabitation. I find therefore that the period of cohabitation for consideration in respect of the [wife’s] claim for spousal support commences March 1997 and concludes with separation on April 10, 2010 for a period of thirteen years.

The wife appealed this ruling, and the Court of Appeal agreed with her reasoning.

In determining the length of cohabitation, the trial judge had been incorrect to “reset” it at the reconciliation point.  Instead, the facts showed that even when the wife went to live with her mother, the couple never formally separated; they merely had what the court called an “interim separation” that included “the possibility of resumption of cohabitation.”  In drawing this conclusion, the court considered the following evidence:

  • They lived apart for only a brief 5-month period;
  • They did not separate their finances;
  • The husband continued to support he wife financially, including allowing her to use a credit card in his name;
  • The wife took only a small suitcase of clothes with her, and no furniture;
  • Although the wife went on a few dates with another man, she was not involved in another relationship;
  • In December 1996, the husband proposed marriage to the wife with a ring and in front of their children, to which she replied “not yet”; and,
  • By February 1997 the parties were discussing marriage.

The Appeal Court concluded that for determining the duration of the husband’s spousal support obligation, the correct period of cohabitation was 16 years and 10 months, less 5 months for the brief separation, for a total of about 16.5 years.

The Court recalculated the wife’s support entitlement accordingly, and determined that she was entitled to spousal support from the husband that would last 14 years from the agreed date of their separation in 2010.

For the full text of the decision, see:

Whalen-Byrne v. Byrne

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

If Only One Person Says “It’s Over”, Is It Really?

If Only One Person Says “It’s Over”, Is It Really?

Who gets to decide when a marriage or other relationship is over? Do both parties have to agree, in the eyes of the law?

That was one of the questions that the court had to ask in a case called Cammaroto Cammaroto.

The facts were a little unusual: The wife wanted out of the dead-end marriage but could not get the husband to leave, likely because he was very comfortable having her pay all the bills. He had never really worked throughout their 10-year marriage, and had not shown any real inclination to get a job. As the court described it:

[The wife] testified that she was trapped in the relationship for many years because she could not get [the husband] to leave and she could not afford to carry two residences making her (in her words) “a prisoner” in the matrimonial home.

The true end-date of the marriage was therefore challenging to pinpoint, and the spouses differed greatly on what that date actually was.

Naturally in a more typical marriage-breakdown scenario, the former partners usually decide to stop living together at some point, making it much easier to isolate the date the relationship has officially ended.   But where – as here – the couple continues to live under the same roof even after one or both of them consider the relationship to be over, the lines can get a little blurry.   It becomes harder to identify the true legal “separation date”.

To frame its determination on this issue, the court stated the law:

Marital relationships cover a broad spectrum and it is difficult to pinpoint when spouses become “separated” while under the same roof. There is no checklist or test that precisely articulates the determination of a valuation date in a case such as this, though courts have articulated factors to consider. It is a fact-driven inquiry in any particular case.

The absence of sexual relations is a factor but it is not conclusive. The degree to which spouses share or segregate income and expenses is important, particularly changes in those arrangements. Communication, social life, interactions with one another in public and behind closed doors all need to be considered. Mutual goals and expectations are relevant. The goal under the Family Law Act‘s property provision is to fix a date on which the economic partnership should as a matter of fairness be terminated. The global question is when it was that the parties knew, or reasonably ought to have known, their spousal relationship was over and would not resume.

On the question of whether one person can unilaterally decide that the marriage is over, the court was unequivocal:

Continuation of a marital relationship requires two people. Either spouse can unilaterally end that relationship without the consent of the other. There are many cases where one spouse knows there will be no reconciliation, but the other may not know. At the same time, the court must be careful to look for some objective evidence upon which to find a date of separation, rather than simply accepting the after-the-fact statements of the party who has decided the relationship is over.

Applying this test to the specific facts in Cammarato, the court found that the relationship had ended a full five years before the couple stopped living together. The court described the marital scene:

By 2005, they ceased to have a sexual or otherwise intimate relationship. Communication between them was largely by notes to one another. They had no social life to speak of. [The husband] had no friends and as a couple they had no mutual friends. Moreover, he objected to and interfered with [the wife’s] association with her own friends and even with her two sons. They had a joint bank account but only [the wife] was putting money into this account after 2006. [The wife’s] description of their relationship is corroborated in some respects by [her doctor’s] notes and the records of the police interventions.

In these circumstances, the court found the marriage was over long before the spouses moved out and went their separate ways. It set the separation date accordingly, for valuing the spouses’ respective assets for equalization.

For the full text of the decision, see:

Cammaroto v Cammaroto, 2015 ONSC 3968 (CanLII)

At Russell Alexander Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders. For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

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