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Posts tagged ‘and enforcement of court orders’

Mother Wins Constitutional Challenge on Child Support for Disabled Adult Child

Mother Wins Constitutional Challenge on Child Support for Disabled Adult Child

The recent decision in a case called Coates v. Watson represents a landmark of constitutional law, with the court finding that section 31 of the Ontario Family Law Act discriminates against the adult disabled children of unmarried parents and is contrary to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The case involved an unmarried Ontario mother who was responsible for caring for her adult disabled son named Joshua. The biological father had paid some child support, but was looking to have the support payments terminated now that Joshua was an adult.

Joshua suffered from DiGeorge syndrome, which left him with both physical and mental health issues. These in turn prevented him from attending school full-time.

The legal issue arose because section 31 of the provincial Family Law Act (“FLA”) states that every parent has an obligation to provide support, but only if the child is a minor or is in school full-time. The meant that in cases where the disabled child cannot attend school, section 31 actually operates to prevent him or her from falling within the definition of “child” and thus qualifying for child support. When applied to Joshua’s case, the law effectively eliminated the biological father’s obligation to assist in supporting his son.

In contrast, the federal Divorce Act contains no such qualification, and imposes a support obligation on the parents of disabled adult children, regardless of whether the child attends school.

In noting this discrepancy between the federal and provincial legislation, the court ultimately concluded that section 31 of the FLA was unconstitutional, because it discriminates against adult disabled children of unmarried parents on various grounds including parental marital status, and disability. That discrimination is contrary to s. 15 of the Charter, which enshrines the principle that every individual is “equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.”

If the ruling in Coates v. Watson stands (and is not overturned on appeal), then there is speculation that the FLA might have to be amended by expanding the definition of “child”, or by incorporating the definition found in the federal Divorce Act.

For the full text of the decision, see:

Coates v. Watson, 2017 ONCJ 454 (CanLII)

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders. For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

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Wednesday’s Video Clip: What Are The Child Support Guidelines?


Wednesday’s Video Clip: What Are The Child Support Guidelines?

In this law video we discuss the child support guidelines.

In 1997, the federal government brought in a set of new rules and tables for calculating the amount of support a parent who does not have custody of his or her child must pay to the parent who has custody.

These rules and tables were later adopted by the Ontario government and are set out in the Child Support Guidelines.

A link to the Federal Child Support Guidelines is provided in the More Information, Courts and Statutes section of our web site Russellalexander.com.

At Russell Alexander Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders. For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

Personal Injury Structured Settlements: Are They “Property” or “Income” Upon Divorce?

Personal Injury Structured Settlements: Are They “Property” or “Income” Upon Divorce?

In a recent family case called Hunks v. Hunks, the court considered whether structured settlements – such as the type that are reached as part of a personal injury claim – are considered “property” or else “income” for the purposes of the property-division and equalization regime under the Ontario Family Law Act (the “FLA”).

In that case, Donna and Gary got married in 1995. A few months later, Donna suffered an injury at a supermarket that left her disabled.   She successfully sued the supermarket, and was awarded more than $500,000 in compensation. After using spending about $200,000 for family-related needs, she used the rest to purchase a structured settlement (which is a mechanism by which a personal injury victim such as Donna could receive her settlement funds on a fixed schedule, rather than all up-front).

That structured settlement was arranged so that she would receive $1,290 per month for the rest of her life, as well as a lump-sum payment of $15,000 every five years (to a maximum of four such payments). All of this was subject to a small annual increase.

Unfortunately, the marriage between Donna and Gary did not flourish, and they separated about 15 years after Donna’s accident. In the course of settling out their financial affairs through the customary equalization process mandated by the FLA, the issue arose as to how the structured settlement should be properly characterized.

A lower court found that conceptually, a structured settlement was similar to a “pension” and rather than be excluded it formed part of Donna’s matrimonial property that was subject to equalization.

However, the Court of Appeal later overturned that ruling.   That court found that the structured settlement was essentially a special type of annuity, and it was more analogous to disability benefits. Under Ontario law, such benefits are considered “income” for FLA purposes, and while not subject to the equalization process per se, they are considered in determining spousal support levels.

For the full text of the decision, see:

Hunks v. Hunks, 2017 ONCA 247 (CanLII)

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders. For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

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“Gender Expression” Now Protected for Kids by Law

“Gender Expression” Now Protected for Kids by Law

In what is perhaps a controversial move, the Ontario government has recently passed legislation to allow children to be removed from their parents who opposed the child’s expression of “gender identity” or “gender expression”.

The Supporting Children, Youth and Families Act of 2017 received Royal Assent on June 1, 2017. Once passed, it will change or repeal/replace existing legislation and implement new requirements directing service providers and other entities to support a child’s choice of gender identity or gender expression.

These amended provisions are aimed primarily at courts, social workers, and adoption services. It mandates that when providing services or considering the best interests and welfare of a child, these entities must consider “race, ancestry, place of origin, color, ethnic origin, citizenship, family diversity, disability, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression.”

It also prevents parents from challenging a child’s same-sex orientation, or with identification not with the gender that he or she was born, but rather the opposite one.

This directive gives rise to a corollary assessment as well: Whether a child should be removed from a home where the parents oppose a child’s declaration of his or her homosexuality or choice of “gender”. The principle behind this part of the legislation is that a parent who refuses to recognize a child’s preference in this regard is actually perpetrating abuse; the child’s removal from the home environment and into child protection facilities would prevent further abuse from occurring.

The new law is not without its controversy. Objectors claim that it represents an unwarranted incursion into the rights of parents, particularly those relating to religion, and embodies an “anti-parent” agenda.

What are your thoughts on these new changes?

For the full text of the new legislation, see:

Supporting Children, Youth and Families Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14.

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders. For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

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Do Partnership Principles Apply to Deciding Who Gets the Dog in a Split?

Do Partnership Principles Apply to Deciding Who Gets the Dog in a Split?

The legal issue of who owns the beloved family pet after separation or divorce has been covered many times by the courts across the country.  As I reported previously on a case called Henderson v. Henderson, the Canadian position is clear: “a dog is a dog. At law it is property, a domesticated animal that is owned. At law it enjoys no familial rights.”

This established principle was applied recently in a B.C. case called Brown v. Larochelle – but with a unique spin: the court held that partnership principles could apply to guessing what the parties might have intended if they turned their mind to what would happen to Luna in the event they broke up.

The young couple lived together for a few years. After their relationship ended the woman brought a court proceeding to determine which of them should get to keep a 3-year-old Korean Jindo rescue dog named “Luna”.   Alternatively, she asked that Luna be shared on/week off basis, or else that the man repay her $475 representing her half of the $950 they had together paid to adopt her.   The man, in contrast, wanted to keep Luna himself.

The court described the lead-up to the dispute this way:

In September of 2015 the parties stopped living together with the [woman] moving to a new apartment that did not permit pets.  In June of 2016 the [woman] obtained permission from her landlady to have pets and contacted the [man] about sharing possession of Luna.

That has led to this litigation.  The [woman] says there was an agreement to share Luna when it became possible.

The [man] says he paid $2,500 to the [woman] when she moved out to adjust certain matters between them and he believed ownership of Luna was one of those matters.

Since September of 2015 the [man] has had virtually exclusive possession of Luna.  The [woman] did take her for some visits/walks some 5 or 6 times after moving out but has had no contact since some time before June of 2016.

After reviewing the Canadian law on the topic, the court confirmed that dogs are treated as property, and distilled the following additional principles from the jurisprudence:

What I extract from the collective wisdom of these cases and some others is as follows:

(a)  pets will not be treated in a manner such as children;

(b)  courts are unlikely to consider interim applications for pet possession;

(c)  Canadian Courts are unlikely to find that joint sharing or some form of constructive trust remedy is apt;

(d)  that pets are a variant of personal property;

The above being acknowledged it is also clear that in Canada there is a legal requirement that animals (and in particular dogs and cats) be treated “humanely” unlike any inanimate personal possession.

The court then considered the fact that the couple had acquired Luna together, in what was essentially a “partnership”:

In this case, Luna was acquired by the parties not individually by either one but rather as what legally might be characterized as a partnership or joint venture.

Basic partnership law provides for an equal division of assets on dissolution of the partnership.  Many partners make agreements as to how they will deal with assets if the partnership winds up.  Many, such as here, do not. …

Applying established partnership principles to the question of the responsibility for Luna post-split, the court added:

… Partnership law requires that partners deal with each other fairly and equitably.  One of the maxims of the law of equity is: “Equity presumes that to be done which ought to have been done”.  In the context of this case, and having seen and heard the parties, I can assume that if they had directed their minds at the time they acquired Luna or during their joint care of her to what would happen if they split-up they would have agreed that this decision would take into account the best interests of Luna and her humane treatment.

After noting some of the tendered evidence that the Jindo breed of dog requires “strong training, patience, and plenty of walks”, the court concluded that joint use of Luna would not be best for her, based on either her breed, or her individual characteristics.   Since it was evident that Luna had “cemented her bond” with the man since the couple’s split, the better decision was to leave her with him.

In the end – and having found no persuasive evidence that the $2,500 the man paid to the woman when they split up was intended to cover Luna in a sort of “property settlement” – the court found that the man was entitled to keep the dog but was required to pay the woman $475 plus minimal court costs.

For the full text of the decision, see:

Henderson v Henderson, 2016 SKQB 282 (CanLII)

At Russell Alexander Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders. For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

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Not All Internet Evidence is Created Equally

Not All Internet Evidence is Created Equally

Recently, I have touched on the issue of whether evidence taken from the Internet is reliable enough for the purpose of Family Law trials.

But as anyone knows who has ever spent time surfing the Internet – which is all of us — there are websites, and then there are websites.  Just because something is on the internet, certainly doesn’t mean that it’s reliable, fully accurate, or even remotely true.

How do courts grapple with determining the reliability of website information, and giving it the proper weight for evidentiary purposes?

In a recent immigration case called El Sayed v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), the applicant had objected to the fact that the Immigration Officer had apparently searched the applicant’s LinkedIn profile, and had made certain judgments about him that reflected negatively on his immigration application.

The court turned its focused attention on the issue of internet evidence reliability, citing approvingly from an earlier case:

With regard to the reliability of the Internet, I accept that in general, official web sites, which are developed and maintained by the organization itself, will provide more reliable information than unofficial web sites, which contain information about the organization but which are maintained by private persons or businesses.

In my opinion, official web sites of well-known organisations can provide reliable information that would be admissible as evidence … For example, it is evident that the official web site of the Supreme Court of Canada will provide an accurate version of the decisions of the Court.

As for unofficial web sites, I accept … that the reliability of the information obtained from an unofficial web site will depend on various factors which include careful assessment of its sources, independent corroboration, consideration as to whether it might have been modified from what was originally available and assessment of the objectivity of the person placing the information on-line. When these factors cannot be ascertained, little or no weight should be given to the information obtained from an unofficial web site.

The court added that this approach was approved in some subsequent Canadian decision, but in others the court still demanded expert testimony as to the reliability of the website information, before it would accept it as evidence for the trial or hearing.

The bottom line, is that courts know that everything you see on the internet is not true.  (Although I’m confident that they would approve of the Blogs on my website).

For the full text of the decisions, see:

El Sayed v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 

ITV Technologies Inc. v. WIC Television Ltd.

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

 

Grandparents Battle It Out for Custody – Should Kids Stay Put Until After Appeal?

 

Grandparents Battle It Out for Custody – Should Kids Stay Put Until After Appeal?

The mother of two children had died in 2013.  About a year later when the father was no longer able to care for them, he handed the children over to his step-parents (who are nonetheless the children’s paternal grandparents by law).

However the maternal grandparents, who lived in British Columbia, also expressed an interest in caring for the children.   In fact, the maternal grandmother moved temporarily to Ontario in order to maintain as close a relationship with the children as possible, and cared for them on a regular basis, in keeping with several temporary court orders that had been made.

Eventually, the two sets of grandparents ended up in a custody battle for the children.  After a three-day hearing, the court granted custody to the maternal grandparents, and gave the paternal grandparents holiday and extended summer access.

The paternal grandparents decided to appeal that Order.   But since there was only a short period of time between when the Order was released and when the children were to be flown to B.C. to join the maternal grandparents, they asked the court for a stay of proceedings (meaning a suspension of the court Order), until they could launch an appeal and have it heard.

The court considered that application, and pointed out that there was a well-established legal test for granting a stay.  Among other things it involved considering whether the children would suffer irreparable harm if the stay was not granted;  on the flip-side involved considering whether granting or denying the stay would foster the children’s best interests.

Looking at those specific aspects of the test, the court observed that to leave the children in the care of the paternal grandparents would be less disruptive than moving them to B.C. pending the appeal hearing.  The court put it this way:

If a stay is not ordered the children will relocate to British Columbia within days. In the event the [paternal grandparents] are then successful in their appeal, the children would be relocated once again to Ontario. No one has suggested that this would be in their best interests. Indeed I would think this might be potentially quite harmful to them.

In reaching this conclusion, the court considered several other factors, including the stable home life the children were currently enjoying with the paternal grandparents, the close and loving relationship they had with them, and the significant turmoil that the children had already had in their young lives.  The court also noted that this was not a situation where they had been removed from the parental grandparents’ care because they were unable to take care of them.

Ultimately the court said:

There is little harm that could come to the children from remaining in the care of the [paternal grandparents] pending completion of the appeal.

However, the court cautioned that the appeal was to be heard expeditiously, and both sets of grandparents were to share the chare of the children until the appeal was fully resolved.

For the full text of the decision, see:

MacLeod v Rae

 

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

Busted! Court Relies on Sworn Financial Statements from First Divorce to Value Assets During Second One

Busted! Court Relies on Sworn Financial Statements from First Divorce to Value Assets During Second One

The husband was a 46-year-old, recently-separated businessman who met the 26-year-old wife when she was a junior at the law firm he used for his business matters and litigation. After they moved in together and he got a divorce from his first marriage, the wife left her job at the law firm to take care of the husband’s litigation and related corporate affairs.

They were married for 14 years before they separated, and had three children.

When they split up, the husband forwarded a newly-prepared separation agreement for the wife’s signature. She signed without obtaining independent legal representation.  She was comfortable doing so because she believed that the husband had provided full disclosure, and she trusted his assessment since he had considerable experience valuing businesses.

Using the business valuation information provided by the husband, the separation agreement would have called for the wife to pay the husband just under $1 million as an equalization payment; however, it also provided that the husband would agree to forgo her having to pay that amount.

Sounds like a good deal, right?

However, the wife slowly realized afterwards that the husband had misled her. Rather than her owe him money in equalization (which he waived), the proper calculation was entirely different because he had greatly overstated the value of the corporate assets that he brought into the relationship, most notably the value of his company at the date of marriage. This would inflate the amount she was adjudged to owe him way of an equalization.

She successfully applied to the court to set aside the separation agreement, on the basis that the husband had not given full financial disclosure.  The trial judge adjusted the calculation accordingly.

The husband appealed.  In support of his business valuation figures, he put forth the evidence of an expert, who attested to the fact that the value of the business on the marriage date was over $7 million.  However, the Appeal Court concluded that the expert was partial to the husband and lacked independence, and had given an inflated figure that could not be trusted.

Instead, the court relied on some “smoking gun” evidence:  the sworn financial statements the husband had filed in his first divorce, which showed that he had essentially brought no assets of value into this second marriage to the wife.  The trial judge had relied on this evidence as well in setting the separation agreement aside, and the Appeal Court confirmed that there was nothing improper about the trial judge having done so, even if it was to the husband’s detriment.

In the end, the husband was found to have intentionally misrepresented the value of his corporate assets, by claiming that they were worth $6 million more than their actual (court-determined) value.

The Appeal Court upheld the trial judge’s decision to set aside the separation agreement, and went on to calculate the proper equalization amounts using the true valuation of the husband’s assets.

For the full text of the decision, see:

       Virc v. Blair

At Russell Alexander Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

Can Mom’s New Partner Participate in “Family” Counselling if He’s Subject to a Restraining Order?

 

Can Mom’s New Partner Participate in “Family” Counselling if He’s Subject to a Restraining Order?

The father and mother, now separated, had two children together.  The father, who worked as a taxi driver, had full custody of them and received no child support from the mother.

The mother had a new partner, Mr. V., who had apparently been abusive not just toward her and the children, but towards the father as well.  As the Court put it, the litigation record was “replete with allegations of abuse perpetrated by Mr. V.” against the father, mother and their children.

On two occasions, the father refused to let the mother have access to the children, despite a Court Order requiring him to do so.  In the face of those two incidents, the mother went straight to court and successfully obtained another Order which held the father in contempt.   The Order also included a provision requiring the mother, father, and children to participate in counselling, and – quite unusually — added that Mr. V. was to participate in the counselling as well.  Moreover, the father was ordered to fully co-operate with all recommendations made by the counselor, and in connection with Mr. V’s participation as well.

Among other grounds, the father successfully appealed the stipulation as to counselling, in part.

Firstly, the Appeal Court observed that in requiring the mother’s current (and allegedly abusive) new partner at the counselling, the trial judge had likely not considered the children’s best interests.   But even from a practical standpoint, that term of the Order was untenable because Mr. V. was the subject of a restraining order, which had been folded into the Order that granted the mother access to the children.  That restraining order prohibited Mr. V from being within 500 meters of where the mother was exercising her access rights. The Court found it was an actually an error in law to order counselling that involved Mr. V.  in the face of an order that restrains his ability to be anywhere near the children.

The Court therefore set aside the part of the Order relating to Mr. V’s involvement, and merely directed that the father was ordered to “attend and co-operate with the counselling process.”

In other words:  The Court concluded that it was a bad idea to have the mother’s new boyfriend at the fractured family’s counselling sessions – particularly since he was alleged to be abusive to everyone else attending, and since he was subject to a restraining order. Perhaps not a surprising outcome.

For the full text of the decision, see:

Ralhan v. Singh

At Russell Alexander Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

 

To All the Amateur Lawyers: How Do You Equalize When the House Cost More to Build, Than it’s Currently Worth?

To All the Amateur Lawyers:  How Do You Equalize When the House Cost More to Build, Than it’s Currently Worth?

Anyone who has built their own “dream home” knows that building costs can spiral out of control, and the project can turn into a financial nightmare. This is even more so, when it comes time to divide the value of the home during a divorce. Some very interesting – and legally perplexing — questions can arise, such as this one:

What happens if the value of the home turns out to be less than the money invested in building or renovating it?

That was the question in a case called Strobele v. Strobele. The court summarized the backstory this way:

Really Dr. and Mrs. Strobele have one issue that bedevils a fair resolution of the proceeding. In the final two years of their relationship, they embarked on a project to construct the house of their dreams. They have, between the two of them, spent all of their life savings and more in the construction of this house and, in the process, considerably exceeding the budget for the project. That budget started in the range of six hundred to $700,000 and, by the end of the project, they had put at least twice and perhaps as much as three times that much money into the project which was more money than the two of them had the time. In the process, of course, they have accumulated debt and a great deal of it.

The legal problem that arises from this uncommon dilemma, is that the rules for equalizing net family property on separation do not apply easily to these kinds of scenarios.  The court explained:

[A]lthough the as-built cost of the house is roughly in the neighbourhood of $1.8 million, its market value is roughly $1.2 million. If this situation was brought about by adverse market forces or poor business choices, the consequences would likely be visited upon the parties equally unless one of them engaged in deliberate or wrongful disposition of assets or there were other unusual circumstances, none of which are present here. As a general practice the phrase “for better or worse, for richer or poorer” comes to mind and is applied. But that is not what happened here.

To complicate matters further, the husband wanted to stay in the home, and apparently had access to the financial resources to do so.

For all the “armchair lawyers” among my readership, how would you divide the home’s value?  And if one of the parties wanted to “buy out” out the other, how would that calculation go?

We’ll leave the question as a cliff-hanger, and I’ll share the legal answer and outcome (at least as the judge determined it in this particular case), in my Blog next week.

For the full text of the decision, see:

Strobele v. Strobele, [2005] O.J. No. 6312, 34 R.F.L. (6th) 111

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com