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Posts from the ‘Support’ Category

Child Support Law Changing to Include Adult Children with Disabilities

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Child Support Law Changing to Include Adult Children with Disabilities

As I reported back this past summer, a court challenge by a single mother of a 22- year-old disabled young man, based on an asserted breach of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, succeeded in upending the law relating to the eligibility for child support for such disabled adults.  The mother had successfully claimed that the child’s father – to whom she was never married – should continue to have a support obligation for the son they had together. She convinced the court that as compared to married parents, the differential treatment parents in her situation was contrary to Charter values.

On the heels of this decision, the Ontario government had promptly announced plans to amend the provincial legislation governing child support by way of Bill 113, as I reported shortly after the ruling was released.

Those amendments, included in omnibus budget legislation called the Stronger, Fairer Ontario Act (Budget Measures) Act, 2017 (Bill 177) [RA: Add link to http://www.ontla.on.ca/web/bills/bills_detail.do?locale=en&Intranet=&BillID=5316], were introduced on November 14, 2017.  They alter the provisions of the Ontario Family Law Act, so that the legislation now requires that every parent provide support, to the extent that the parent is capable of doing so, for his or her unmarried child who is “unable by reason of illness or disability to withdraw from the charge of his or her parents.”

The legal impact of the upcoming amendments is that:

  • the category of adult children who are eligible for child support is now expanded (since previously it included only adult children who are attending school full-time);
  • the child support obligation applies in respect of not only children of parents who are married, but also those with unmarried parents; and
  • the Family Law Act is now in-line with federal Divorce Act legislation, and with the law in many other Canadian jurisdictions.

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

 

 

Long-Awaited Update to Federal Child Support Guidelines

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Long-Awaited Update to Federal Child Support Guidelines

Important news for those who pay – or are eligible to receive – child support anywhere in Canada.

What are the “Guidelines”?

As most of my readers will know, the Federal Child Support Guidelines (the “Guidelines”) are the government-sponsored tool that help separated and divorcing parents set the appropriate amounts of child support that must be paid in respect of the children they have together.

The Federal Child Support Tables, which reflect the principles and calculations mandated by the Guidelines, set out the basic monthly amounts of child support that are result from various permutations.

The Guidelines and the corresponding Tables have been in force since late 2011, and until recently have reflected the calculations that accord with 2011 tax rules.

What’s New?

The Guidelines and corresponding Tables have been amended to reflect more recent tax rules, and have been incorporated into an updated version that takes effect on November 22, 2017. The official (and updated) Federal Child Support Tables, plus additional information and some “legalese” about these new amendments, are located here.

Where, and When?

As with the last version of the simplified Tables in PDF, there is a streamlined, simplified version of the 2017 Tables (also in PDF).  There is also a Child Support Table Look-up for both the 2011 and 2017 versions.  There is also an updated, Step-by-Step Guide.   (Note however that these streamlined and simplified versions are not “official”; only the original Federal Child Support Guidelines and Tables are considered legally-authoritative as to child support amounts.  This also means that the amounts of calculated support may be different when using the official Guildelines or Tables versus the more simplified tools).

One final point:  the new 2017 Guidelines and Tables come into force on November 21, 2017.   For people who need to determine how much child support is owed for a period before that date, the prior version of the Guidelines should still be used.  (And for those who need to calculate child support for a period earlier than December 31, 2011, an even earlier version of the Tables should be consulted.)

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

 

Should (Another) 20-Year-Old Cohabitation Agreement Be Upheld?

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Should (Another) 20-Year-Old Cohabitation Agreement Be Upheld?

A few weeks ago, I wrote about a case in which the court was asked whether a separation agreement signed by a couple 20 years earlier should be upheld.

Coincidentally, another recent Ontario Court of Appeal case involved a similar circumstance.

When the couple started living together 20 years ago – and at the husband’s insistence, since he’d had a prior relationship end acrimoniously – they signed a cohabitation agreement.  The husband took care of having it drafted, and he presented it to the wife for her signature.  He wanted the security of having the agreement in place before moving forward in the relationship and buying a home with her.

The wife did not have independent legal advice at the time, although she was given the opportunity to obtain it.  Under the terms of the agreement she signed, the wife agreed to give up all her claims to spousal support.

Still, when they separated 20 years later, she claimed for spousal support nonetheless.  The trial judge upheld the separation agreement, and dismissed her claim for support.  The wife brought an appeal.

In evaluating whether to allow that appeal, the court had to embark on a two-stage analysis, the first stage of which required it to:

1) look at the circumstances surrounding the negotiation and execution of the agreement, to determine whether there was any reason to discount it; and then

2) consider the substance of the agreement, to determine whether it was in substantial compliance with the general objectives of the Divorce Act at the time it was formed.

Then, in the second stage, the court had to consider – now 20 years later – whether the wife had established that the agreement no longer reflects the original intention of the parties, and whether the cohabitation agreement is still in substantial compliance with the legislated objectives of the modern-day Divorce Act.

Applying those standards here, the wife argued that the agreement was invalid, and that the trial judge failed to consider certain important facts when applying this two-stage test, namely:

  • That there was a power imbalance between her and the husband;
  • That she had not discussed spousal support with the husband;
  • That the husband’s financial disclosure was incomplete; and
  • That she did not have independent legal advice.

While conceding that she was not coerced, the wife argued that the agreement simply did not align with the overall objectives of the Divorce Act, whether now or back when it was signed.  This was particularly true since the couple went on to have an 18-year relationship, they had two children together for whom the wife bore the primary responsibility, and his income exceeded hers.

The Appeal Court considered the wife’s arguments.  After examining the objectives of the legislation, it rejected her spousal support request. There had been no error of law or misapprehension of fact by the trial judge, who carefully reviewed the relevant test and found:

  • The wife was aware of the husband’s desire to have a cohabitation agreement.
  • They had discussed the cohabitation agreement before the wife received it.
  • She was aware of all of the husband’s sources of income and assets, but did not pursue further disclosure.
  • She skimmed over the cohabitation agreement, reading some parts but not others.
  • There was no fraud, coercion, or duress.
  • Although given the opportunity, the wife did not seek independent legal advice even though – on her evidence – she had six weeks to do so.
  • At the time of signing the agreement, the wife thought it was fair and that it fairly outlined the parties’ discussions regarding the purchase of a house.
  • The agreement is in substantial compliance with the Divorce Act.

The court noted that the trial judge was entitled to make the findings that he did on the evidence, and are entitled to deference from appeal court.  It added that even if the cohabitation agreement did not exist, on all the facts the wife would not be entitled to spousal support anyway.  The court dismissed her appeal.

For the full text of the decision, see:

Smith v. Smith

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

 

 

Mother’s Bid to Relocate Child – Was it Just a Pretext to Join New Romantic Partner?

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Mother’s Bid to Relocate Child – Was it Just a Pretext to Join New Romantic Partner?

The parents of a 5-year old boy had separated in 2015, and had a court-approved agreement as to joint custody and shared parenting.  The mother now wanted to relocate with her son from Cochrane, Ontario to Thunder Bay where she had multiple job offers waiting.  She had recently quit her job as a prison transport officer in Cochrane, which did not allow her to properly fulfill her childcare responsibilities. As the court explained:

…. [H]er schedule was unpredictable; sometimes working out of town, sometimes working overtime, sometimes both, and never knowing until the last minute. This would have impaired her ability to care for her son – not knowing in advance whether she would be called in to work in the morning before he went to school, or whether she would be home in time to pick him up again – but her employer temporarily accommodated her with a schedule that avoided unpredictable deployment. Eventually, however, her employer withdrew this accommodation. After exhausting her vacation time and sick leave, the mother resigned her position. Prior to her resignation, her employer invited her to apply for another position in Cochrane with a more parenting-friendly schedule. She was successful, but the employer subsequently had to revoke the offer.

The mother said the move to Thunder Bay was necessary to remain financially viable and provide for her son, and that as the son’s primary caregiver, her decisions about where to live and work out to be given considerable weight.

The father objected to the mother’s plan.  For one thing, it would strip him of the chance to influence his son.   For another, he claimed the mother’s alleged need to move was merely a pretext to be with her new romantic partner, who also lived in Thunder Bay.   He also questioned her lack of ability to find new work in Cochrane, and felt that – since she had quit her job – her current state of financial hardship was self-imposed.

The mother’s bid to move had been rejected earlier by a motion judge, who discounted the allegation that the ostensible need for the move was a pretext.  However, the judge did conclude that both parents’ views had equal weight, and that the resolution called for a simple balancing of pros and cons between Cochrane and Thunder Bay, from the perspective of how the boy might benefit. In the end, the motion judge concluded that the mother should be able to find suitable work in Cochrane if she tried.

The Appeal Court saw things differently, and granted the mother’s appeal.

First of all, the motion judge had erred in not characterizing the mother as the primary caregiver, and in not giving her particular reasons for moving “serious consideration.”  Also, the judge was wrong in deciding that the mother’s financial circumstances were not self-imposed; they were brought on by the employer’s withdrawal of prior accommodation of her childcare responsibilities.  Nor was there any basis for the judge to conclude that the mother could likely find work in Cochrane – in fact the evidence showed otherwise.

The Appeal Court explained:

There is, in our view, a valid and compelling parenting-based reason for the move: it is necessary to enable the primary caregiver to remain financially viable while providing care for the child. The mother has done all she can be expected to do to secure employment in Cochrane. It has not worked out, and there is no good reason for her and her son to live in poverty when she has secured employment in Thunder Bay that will allow her both to parent her son and to provide economically for him.

The court also said it was “encouraged” in this regard by the fact that the mother had offered to provide air travel to Cochrane for the child, which was one of her employment benefits at one of the Thunder Bay jobs.  She also offered to accommodate the father’s work schedule as a forest firefighter when he was deployed across Canada.

The court granted the mother’s appeal, allowing her to move with the child to Thunder Bay, and ordered a new access regime, with the parents working out an acceptable access schedule between them.

For the full text of the decision, see:

Porter v. Bryan

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

Couple’s Use of Support Set-Off Calculations Costs Husband His $15,000 Tax Credit

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Use of Support Set-Off Calculations Costs Husband His $15,000 Tax Credit

The husband and wife separated in 2011.  Based on their respective yearly incomes, they amicably resolved their issues as to child support by way of an agreement and consent order that was filed with the court.   They reached an agreement on child support by using a software program which, as the court put it, “introduce[d] various offsetting inputs and devise[d] a final unilateral payment from one spouse to the other.”

The outcome of the calculations was that the husband owed a single payment to the wife, who acknowledged that he was not required to pay further support for a specified time-period.   On this income tax return for the year, the husband then went ahead and claimed non-refundable child tax credits of almost $15,000 in respect of their two children.

As the court explained:

All of the usual stressful, difficult and emotional issues for this couple relating to child custody, financial support and raising a family within the constraints of marriage breakdown were resolved in a laudatory, sensible and agreeable fashion. [The husband] testified all issues settled amicably. Lawyers were involved to prepare all documents, undertake court proceedings and ensure all details complied with the parties’ wishes and the law. All seemed to unfold accordingly until the Minister’s reassessment disallowing the 2012 dependent deductions. Understandably, [the husband’s] child support commitment was predicated upon his use of the dependent deductions to reduce his taxable income.

The problem was that the Income Tax Act provision under which the husband had purported to claim that tax credit, namely s. 118(5.1), was an exception to the general rule in another section of the Act that disallows a support-paying person from claiming a tax deduction for dependents in certain stipulated instances.  Under the wording of that latter provision, the loss or non-use of the dependent deduction could be prevented only where both parents factually pay to the other an amount for child support.

In this case, since the spouses had essentially used a set-off procedure to come up with a single payment by the husband to the wife, there was no such payment by each of them separately, as the provision required.

Unfortunately, this meant that the Minister of National Revenue disallowed the $15,000 the husband purported to claim under s. 118(5.1) of the Act.  Because the husband was the only spouse to pay “a support amount”, the Minister concluded, he did not fall within the exception in s. 118(5.1) and was not eligible.

The husband appealed the Minister’s decision, but was unsuccessful.   The court pointed out that the case law precedent was uniform in its interpretation of the Act, and that the fact that the couple had used a set-off mechanism in the course of calculating their child support obligations to each other did not transform the respective and distinct values they used into “a support amount” as that term is used in the Act’s provision.  The Act, as worded, did not accommodate for the “expeditious use of a computer software program, the culmination of which is a unilateral payment of a support amount by only one parent to the other.”

Despite this outcome arguably based on technicalities, the court said it had “no alternative but to dismiss” the husband’s appeal, “however sympathetic it may be.”

For the full text of the decision, see:

Harder v. The Queen

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

 

 

Wednesday’s Video Clip: Child Support & Parents on Social Assistance


Wednesday’s Video Clip: Child Support & Parents on Social Assistance

Parents on social assistance who have custody of their children must make reasonable efforts to get support from the other parent. If they do not, they may receive less assistance, or none at all. If they do not already have a support agreement or order, they are expected to get one. They must give information about the other parent to a family support worker who can help them get a support agreement or order.

They should get legal advice before signing any agreement worked out on their behalf.

They may not have to try to get support if the other parent:

• has a history of violence towards them or their child

• cannot be found (but they must give their worker any information they have that might help find the other parent),

• or is not working and cannot afford to pay support (if he or she starts working again, then support can be re-ordered).

The amount of any child support they receive is deducted from their social assistance. So, their total income does not change because of the child support.

Usually, the payments go directly to them, and that same amount is deducted from their monthly social assistance cheque. But if there is a history of non-payment, the child support payments can be assigned to Ontario Works (OW) or the Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP). Then they will get their whole social assistance cheque, even when the support payments are not paid.

Parents on social assistance who do not have custody are expected to pay child support to the extent that they can, as set out in the Child Support Guidelines. Currently, the Guidelines do not require support payments from parents whose income is less than about $6,700 a year.

At Russell Alexander Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders. For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

Court Finds Husband Just “Going Through the Motions” on His Job Search

Court Finds Husband Just “Going Through the Motions” on His Job Search

One of the basic principles underpinning Ontario family law, is that the parties must behave with good faith towards each other in when participating in the separation and divorce process. And courts are wary – and frequently critical – of spouses who do not behave this way.

This is illustrated in the decision in Cammaroto v. Cammaroto. There, the couple had married in 2000 after a 2-year long distance relationship, with the 48-year-old husband moving from New York to be with the wife in Ontario. He had expected to easily find work in the retail travel industry, but this never panned out, and he began to drink heavily. Meanwhile the wife, aged 44, was working 12-hour shifts in her job as a nurse.

By 2008, the relationship deteriorated to the point where the husband communicated with the wife mainly by giving her notes and list. Still, the couple continued to live together under the same roof for several more years.

As part of their divorce proceedings, the court had to decide whether the husband should be entitled to spousal support from the wife, who had been supporting him for the entirety of their marriage.

To make this determination, the court had to consider the couple’s overall relationship. In the husband’s favour was the fact that he had moved from New York and left behind a secure job. But by 2006, which was 6 years into the marriage, he had made virtually no genuine effort to find work and the wife had clearly run out of patience. The court concluded that the husband’s failure had been “a very significant cause of the marriage break-down”, and that his alcohol consumption also contributed to it.

The court itemized the husband’s so-called efforts to find work in this manner:

Exhibit 29 records [the husband’s] attempts to find employment. It illustrates a wide ranging attempt at looking into potential jobs, even low level employment such as flyer deliveries, gas bar employment and entry level sales positions. It records a range of dozens of small local employers as well as large chains such as Walmart, Staples, Rogers, Canadian Tie, Home Depot, the LCBO, several hotel chains, Zellers and Leons.

The most impressive aspect of [the husband’s] attempts to find employment are the personalized and well-written cover letters that he sent with resumes or job applications. Superficially, the documentation of [the husband’s] employment search over the years 2000 – 2006 is impressive. However, on closer examination it is apparent that [the husband] was “going through the motions”, documenting many contacts from ads for jobs that he must have known he could not do or would not accept even if he could get a job interview. Some of the content of Exhibit 29 is clearly an attempt to “pad” his efforts to find employment. For example, it is rather silly to include employment as a flight attendant, a short-order cook, a store manager, etcetera. The actual number of job interviews he got over the years was few.

In 2001, [the husband] applied for 17 jobs in total, never more than three in any given month. He agreed on cross-examination that it was not a “diligent” job search that year. In 2002, he made one job application and in 2003, 31. He admitted on cross-examination that many of the “applications” were for jobs he could not do anyway. …

It is also hard to escape the inference that Mr. Cammaroto deliberately sabotaged the only successes he had.

He obtained a job in the travel industry in 2003 but quit the job after taking the initiative with U.S. authorities to check if he could be “in trouble” as a U.S. citizen selling trips to Cuba. He blew the whistle on himself. Then, when told it was not a problem to work for a travel agency selling trips to Cuba so long as he didn’t do so personally, he quit the job anyway.

He was hired as a security guard in December 2005 or January 2006 but quit that job before his first shift to take another travel agency job that lasted only a few weeks.

In April 2006 he was hired at Stock Transportation to drive autistic children in a van but quit during the training session because the children were “wild and noisy” and he was afraid he would crash the vehicle.

There are other examples of how he thwarted actual employment opportunities himself or wasted his time on obviously fruitless pursuits. It is hard to know whether he was genuinely interested in working or just kidding himself. He turned looking for a job and the documentation of his efforts into a job itself. By 2006 he had given up any real effort. Perhaps even before that.

The court also noted that by 2010, when he and the wife were still living together, he was actively looking for other relationships on Match.com under what he called his “contingency plan”. It ultimately concluded that the husband’s lack of genuine job-hunting had been deliberate:

[The husband] admitted that as early as 2008 he was aware of the “rule of 65” in the spousal support advisory guidelines, referencing the principle that if a dependent spouse’s age plus years of marriage equals or exceeds 65 then recommended spousal support should be for an “indefinite” duration.

It is clear from all the evidence that [the husband] was determined to delay the inevitable separation as long as possible to maximize his entitlement to support and not because there was any realistic hope, even in his own mind, that a true marital relationship would ever resume.

Still, the court observed that at the time of the trial, the husband had been out of the workforce for 15 years, and had depression, anxiety, and some other mental health issues that clearly pre-dated the marriage. In these circumstances, he was entitled to some time-limited support from the wife, who had the ability to pay from her $90,000 income as a nurse.

For the full text of the decision, see:

Cammaroto v. Cammaroto, 2015 ONSC 3968

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders. For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

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Wednesday’s Video Clip: Obligations to Pay Child Support Even with Undue Hardship


Wednesday’s Video Clip: Obligations to Pay Child Support Even with Undue Hardship

In this video we review a court decision in which the court confirmed that a father was still obligated to pay support for his two children from a first marriage even though: 1) he no longer had a relationship with them; 2) he had a new family (and two other small children) to support; and 3) the child support obligation would cause him undue hardship, in light of his difficult financial circumstances.

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders. For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

Evidence from the Internet – Is It Good Enough for Court?

Evidence from the Internet – Is It Good Enough for Court?

In a case I reported on recently called Caine v. Ferguson the father claimed that his income was too low for him to pay child support for his daughter. The court considered evidence designed to refute his claim, put forth by the opposing side and taken from various U.S. music-industry-specific websites. The court wrote:

[The lawyer] submitted that the [father] could be earning $35,000 per annum as a musician. In support of this argument, she attempted to introduce internet articles from two websites from the United States, called Payscale and Musician Wages.com.

The court reflected on the general trustworthiness of these kinds of tendered materials sourced from the Internet, and pointed out that the dependability will vary with their source and nature:

In [prior court cases, the court] permitted the introduction of reports from Ontario Job Futures and Statistics Canada as evidence of income levels for a payor in the insurance industry. In these cases, the reports came directly from provincial and federal governments and had some indicia of reliability. However … I expressed the need to exercise considerable caution in how much weight the court could attach to such documents as they were unsworn third-party statements that could not be tested by cross-examination.

Ultimately, in this instance the court rejected the music-industry website evidence outright, stating:

The documents sought to be introduced here are much more problematic. There was no evidence led that the documents were from reputable sources …  No foundation was provided as to the qualifications of the writers of the documents. The articles were both from the United States. The author of the Musician Wages.com article is an associate conductor of a Broadway play. There was no evidence indicating that he would have any knowledge about what level of income a freelance musician could earn in Toronto. The articles were from 2007 and 2008 respectively. I did not admit the documents into evidence as they did not come close to achieving threshold reliability.

Although a court’s determination will vary from case-to-case, the question of the admissibility and reliability of internet evidence can arise in virtually all kinds of cases, not just those that spring from family disputes.

In fact, it came up squarely in a 2017 immigration case called El Sayed v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), where the court’s conclusions included a commonsense point: Information from official web sites, developed and maintained by the relevant organization itself, is more reliable than unofficial ones which contain information about the organization but which are maintained by private persons or businesses.

In a future blog post, I will discuss some of the other principles confirmed and summarized in that recent immigration case.

For the full text of the decisions, see:

Caine v. Ferguson, 2012 ONCJ 139 (CanLII)

El Sayed v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 39 (CanLII)

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders. For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines – Are They a Package Deal?

Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines – Are They a Package Deal?

In a decision called Mason v. Mason, the Ontario Court of Appeal considered a narrow legal question: Is a judge entitled to use the Spousal Support Advisory (SSAGs) for partial purposes, but disregard it for others? And if the judge departs from using the SSAGs, must he or she give specific reasons for doing so?

The Masons were a husband and wife who had decided to divorce after a marriage spanning almost 20 years. During their relationship they had worked together to build a successful business, and after separating were able to settle all issues except the amount of spousal support that the husband should pay the wife in the circumstances. They went to court to have a trial judge determine that amount for them.

In his reasons, he had made a finding that the husband’s annual income was about $400,000, including certain corporate income that came from the husband buying out the wife from the business. He determined the wife’s income to be about $82,500.  After consulting the SSAGs to determine the proper range of support, he ordered the husband to pay about $9,000 per month.

The former spouses appealed, each claiming that the trial judge had incorrectly approached the income determinations, and had mis-used the SSAGs in doing so. They took issue with the income that had been attributed to them and with the resulting amount of the support award.

As many of you will know, for Canadian judges who are asked to determine spousal support upon the dissolution of marital relationship, the SSAGs set out a pre-determined – but non-mandatory – set of calculations.   As the name suggests, they are “advisory” in nature.

But in this case the Appeal Court found that the trial judge had used them incorrectly:   In the process of reviewing and setting the parties’ respective income, he had used the SSAGs to set the range of appropriate support, but then had abandoned using them when it came time to make the actual income determination.   The Appeal Court said:

As the trial judge was using the SSAGs to determine the amount of spousal support, it was incumbent on him to either rely on the Guideline provisions for determining income — or to explain why they should not apply.

It’s a thinly-sliced distinction, but means that despite being an advisory guide, once the trial judge had referred to the SSAGs in determining the spousal support range, he was required to at least explain why he considered them inapplicable in the Masons’ case.

With that said, the Appeal Court reiterated that the SSAGs “cannot be used as a software tool or formula” whereby the judge merely plugs in the income figures, obtains a range, and chooses the midpoint. They must be “considered in context and applied in their entirety”. The Appeal Court also pointed out that the trial judge had given too few reasons on how the specifics of the various dollar-amounts were calculated.

In the end, having identified errors in the trial judge’s income calculations for both parties, the Appeal Court declined to send the matter back to trial, and opted instead to make the income adjustments itself. It adjusted the husband’s income downward by about $200,000, and the wife’s upward by about $20,000. The spousal support component, payable by the husband to the wife, was adjusted to $1,500 per month.

For the full text of the decision, see

Mason v. Mason, 132 O.R. (3d) 641, 2016 ONCA 725 (CanLII)

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders. For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com