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Posts from the ‘Costs’ Category

Wednesday’s Video Clip: Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers

Wednesday’s Video Clip: Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers

Our fees are based on the following elements:

(a) The time spent on your behalf, and the service which is performed;

(b) The complexities of the issues, and your potential emotional and monetary exposure;

(c) The results accomplished, and the extent to which the expertise of this firm contributed to a successful outcome;

(d) The degree and type of resistance encountered; and,

(e) The extent to which any work needs to be performed on an emergency basis.

None of these elements are capable of a precise arithmetic assessment, and no such assessment is attempted, except in a general way with respect to the time spent. A standard hourly rate, is applied to convert the time into a monetary figure. Any amount that exceeds the number of hours multiplied by the standard rates is the result of the weighing of the other elements mentioned.

We charge standard hourly rates for the work done by our law clerks and lawyers for the time spent on your case. Records are kept (in our computer time-keeping system) by us to the nearest one tenth of an hour, for all activity on your case, including conferences, telephone calls, e-mail, preparing correspondence and memoranda, drafting documents, research and travel time. Each hour billed to you is based on actual work done on your particular case.

Our absence from the office on your behalf is charged at the usual hourly rate. Travel time includes attending at court, settlement conferences, meetings, or consultations on your behalf. We will minimize travel expenses and courthouse time, if any, whenever possible. However, as you will be charged for our traveling time (in addition to the counsel fee), it may be worthwhile to consider whether a local lawyer is desirable for you if your litigation is taking place in another community.

If your appointment is for a consultation only, in order for you to receive advice on a limited number of issues, or, for example, for a second opinion, you will be billed a flat rate consultation fee, payable prior to the consultation. The consultation is not meant to deal with your whole legal problem. These rates are reduced rates, and apply only if the fee is paid at the time of the consultation. The rates are calculated on the basis of the average amount of time spent by our lawyers on consultations in the most recent year.

At Russell Alexander Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders. For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

Financial Disclosure: If One Spouse is Dishonest, Must the Other Actively Investigate?

 Financial Disclosure: If One Spouse is Dishonest, Must the Other Actively Investigate?

In a case I reported on last week, called Virc v. Blair, the husband had deliberately and materially misrepresented the value of the corporations that he brought into the marriage, which eventually came to light upon the couples’ separation.

Although the matter resulted in the court re-calculating the parties’ equalization entitlements in accord with the more accurate corporate valuation, the case raised an interesting corollary legal question:

If one party deliberately misleads the other, does it become the other’s obligation to actively investigate into that dishonesty?

In Virc v. Blair, the parties had gone before a motion judge on a procedural matter relating to what turned out to be the husband’s incomplete and misleading financial disclosure.   Once the motion judge had assumed that the husband had made certain material misrepresentations, the judge shifted the burden and placed it on the wife to inquire as to the truthfulness of the husband’s financial disclosure.

The Court of Appeal later held this was an error.  It said:

In the face of a deliberate material misrepresentation, the onus is not appropriately placed on the recipient spouse.  Rather, the burden is on the party disclosing to establish actual knowledge of the falsehood by the recipient. 

In other words, and contrary to what the husband claimed, there was no law to the effect that a spouse who receives financial disclosure in a matrimonial case is under an obligation investigate or test the veracity of the information provided by the other spouse.   Rather, the effect of the deliberate material non-disclosure remains the focal point (unless the dishonest spouse can prove that the other spouse conclusively knew of the dishonesty).

As the court said a little later in the judgment:

The law does not entitle a liar to succeed just because the recipient of the falsehoods has not ferreted them out.

For the full text of the decision, see:

Virc v. Blair

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

Busted! Court Relies on Sworn Financial Statements from First Divorce to Value Assets During Second One

Busted! Court Relies on Sworn Financial Statements from First Divorce to Value Assets During Second One

The husband was a 46-year-old, recently-separated businessman who met the 26-year-old wife when she was a junior at the law firm he used for his business matters and litigation. After they moved in together and he got a divorce from his first marriage, the wife left her job at the law firm to take care of the husband’s litigation and related corporate affairs.

They were married for 14 years before they separated, and had three children.

When they split up, the husband forwarded a newly-prepared separation agreement for the wife’s signature. She signed without obtaining independent legal representation.  She was comfortable doing so because she believed that the husband had provided full disclosure, and she trusted his assessment since he had considerable experience valuing businesses.

Using the business valuation information provided by the husband, the separation agreement would have called for the wife to pay the husband just under $1 million as an equalization payment; however, it also provided that the husband would agree to forgo her having to pay that amount.

Sounds like a good deal, right?

However, the wife slowly realized afterwards that the husband had misled her. Rather than her owe him money in equalization (which he waived), the proper calculation was entirely different because he had greatly overstated the value of the corporate assets that he brought into the relationship, most notably the value of his company at the date of marriage. This would inflate the amount she was adjudged to owe him way of an equalization.

She successfully applied to the court to set aside the separation agreement, on the basis that the husband had not given full financial disclosure.  The trial judge adjusted the calculation accordingly.

The husband appealed.  In support of his business valuation figures, he put forth the evidence of an expert, who attested to the fact that the value of the business on the marriage date was over $7 million.  However, the Appeal Court concluded that the expert was partial to the husband and lacked independence, and had given an inflated figure that could not be trusted.

Instead, the court relied on some “smoking gun” evidence:  the sworn financial statements the husband had filed in his first divorce, which showed that he had essentially brought no assets of value into this second marriage to the wife.  The trial judge had relied on this evidence as well in setting the separation agreement aside, and the Appeal Court confirmed that there was nothing improper about the trial judge having done so, even if it was to the husband’s detriment.

In the end, the husband was found to have intentionally misrepresented the value of his corporate assets, by claiming that they were worth $6 million more than their actual (court-determined) value.

The Appeal Court upheld the trial judge’s decision to set aside the separation agreement, and went on to calculate the proper equalization amounts using the true valuation of the husband’s assets.

For the full text of the decision, see:

       Virc v. Blair

At Russell Alexander Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders.  For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

For Amateur Lawyers, Part 2: Equalizing a House that Cost More to Build than it’s Worth

For Amateur Lawyers, Part 2: Equalizing a House that Cost More to Build than it’s Worth

As I reported last week, the case of Strobele v. Strobele involved a couple who in the two years leading up to their final split had invested all their life savings (and more) to build their “dream home”. Unfortunately, it turned out that not only was the construction project the “death-knell” to their relationship, but the home also ended up being worth far less than it cost them to build/renovate.

At the end of the day, the home cost about $1.8 million to build, but ended up being worth $1.2 million, with title solely in the husband’s name. The wife had contributed $240,000 of her own money to the construction project over the years they were together.

So how does a Family Court split a home that’s worth less than what the spouses invested in it? The answer: With some complex calculations, and after looking at all the circumstances.

An already-tricky scenario was made somewhat more complicated by the fact that the husband wanted to buy the wife out, so that he could stay in the home. This meant that one of the many issues for the court was how much the husband should have to pay her.

The court first ruled out doing a straightforward Net Family Property calculation using the home’s current low market value. That would result in allowing the husband to stay in the home, obtain the benefit of the surroundings, and have the wife make further payments towards the home’s cost. This, the court stated, would be unfair.

Instead, the court had to look at the economic consequences of the relationship and its breakdown. The couple had moved into the home before they got married, and the wife spent $240,000 of her own money on construction projects both prior to and after marriage. They had enjoyed a relatively equal economic partnership throughout their relationship.

The fair approach was thus to calculate – and to divide equally – the overall losses that the couple sustained in building their dream home, and to give the wife a 50 percent equitable interest in the home – whatever that might turn out to be – by way of resulting trust.

Using an as-built value of $1.8 million, and a market value of $1.2 million, the court focused on “consumption value”, which would lead to a determination of what the parties’ loss on investment was. In these circumstances, the parties had each lost one-third of their overall investment in the home.

When that discount ratio was applied to the $240,000 that the woman put in over the course of their relationship, this meant she had lost one-third of that, too. In other words, rather than have the wife emerge with nothing from her $240,000 investment, the fair solution was to gross-down that figure by one-third, to represent her losses.

So after the normal equalization calculation the husband was at liberty to purchase the wife’s interest in the home for $160,000 and also personally assume all the debt associated with the house. Or, if that transaction did not take place and he chose not to buy her out, then the house could be sold and the loss that results could be divided equally between the parties through the usual equalization process.

Was this the outcome you would have predicted? What are your thoughts?
For the full text of the decision, see:

Strobele v. Strobele, [2005]

At Russell Alexander Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders. For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

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Representing Yourself and Asking for Legal Costs? Read this First

Representing Yourself and Asking for Legal Costs? Read this First

Recently I wrote about a ruling on costs where a self-represented litigant was awarded significantly more in legal costs, than she had requested after trial.

That case, called McMurter v. McMurter, gave the court an opportunity to revisit some of the prior authorities on the issue, and to set out the principles that apply to awarding legal costs to self-represented family litigants.

Based on that review, if you succeed in represented yourself in your family law trial or motion and are looking to be awarded your legal costs from your unsuccessful opponent, here is what you need to know:

  • Whether you are legally trained or not, you cannot claim the same costs as a lawyer would charge. Instead, you can receive a “moderate” or “reasonable” allowance for your lost time.
  • Courts recognize that every litigant must prepare for court to some extent, whether represented by lawyer or not. So if you decide to represent yourself, you can only recover for the time and effort above and beyond what an average person would devote to getting ready for the proceeding.
  • You must also demonstrate that you spent time and effort doing work ordinarily done by a lawyer retained to conduct the litigation, and that you incurred an opportunity cost because of it.
  • Even if you did not give up remunerative activity to represent yourself in court, the court may award you costs for what would otherwise be lawyer’s work on the case. This means that you can get legal costs even if you are a homemaker, retirees, students, unemployed, unemployable, or disabled, etc.
  • The quality of your work as a self-represented person will also be a factor in the court’s assessment of what costs you might be awarded.

In terms of the actual fees, courts can vary widely on how they approach the mathematical calculation. Some will award an hourly rate varying from $20 to $150 per hour, minus the time you would have spent on the case if you had a lawyer present. Others have a “rule of thumb” that allows for a certain number of hours of preparation time, and a certain number of hours of trial time.

In any event, the amount must be reasonable, proportional and with the losing party’s expectations.

Returning to the McMurter v. McMurter case, the court applied these principles in awarding the wife her legal costs award of $30,000, even though she had asked for $18,000. It found that she had successfully represented herself in a complex case where there was a lot at stake. She had been exceptionally well-organized and presented her arguments well, and dealt with complicated legal issues and various family legislation. As the court put it, “She did the work of a lawyer in addition to the work expected of her as a litigant.”

For the full text of the decision, see:

McMurter v. McMurter, 2017 ONSC 725 (CanLII)

Main judgment:

McMurter v. McMurter 2016 ONSC 1225 (S.C.J.)

Fong v. Chan, 1999 CanLII 2052 (ON CA)

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders. For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

 

For a Divorce Trial, is $430,000 in Legal Fees Too Much?

For a Divorce Trial, is $430,000 in Legal Fees Too Much?

Anyone who has gone through a divorce will know that legal costs can get out of control. But consider the recent Ontario case of McCabe v Tissot, where the court was asked to rule on whether the husband should pay the wife’s legal fees of $430,000, part of divorce litigation that “financially devastated” both former spouses, and which saw the wife alone rack up almost $1 million in legal fees overall.

The court’s first step was to determine which member of the sparring couple had been the successful party at trial, because under Ontario civil procedure this is essentially the starting-point for determining how costs should be apportioned, although additional factors come into play as well. Both parties claimed that they had been entirely successful on all significant issues.

Perhaps not surprisingly, in addition to disputing her entitlement the husband also took issue with the wife’s dollar-figure: the $430,000 she was claiming was both excessive and disproportionate, in his view. The wife had chosen to endlessly litigate to the point where both parties’ financial stability, and thus the well-being of their son, was in jeopardy.  He said that for his own part, he had been financially ruined by the whole process.

The court, after considering the various circumstances (including the reasonableness of the parties’ positions at trial, the offers to settle they had exchanged, and prior courts orders), agreed that the wife had been more successful overall. But it rejected the notion that she should receive the full costs she was claiming. The court said:

[t]he amount of legal fees spent by the parties on this litigation is astronomical and completely unreasonable. The [wife] has mortgaged her home and has very little equity left as was her evidence at trial and as set out in her sworn Financial Statements. The [husband] also spent an exorbitant amount on legal fees borrowing funds from his parents to finance the first trial. The [wife] alone has spent close to $1 million on legal fees and disbursements. The [husband] borrowed over $393,000 from his parents. The fees spent by the parties are completely disproportionate to the issues before the court.

The court continued:

The parties lost sight of what is reasonable and what is proportionate. The financial devastation suffered by this family will last a lifetime. Most importantly it will once again negatively impact their son….

And further:

…from the spring of 2013 onward conflict ensued and they attended court numerous times, obtaining approximately 41 court orders. Not only did this financially devastate the parties and affect Liam detrimentally as set out in my Reasons, but it also resulted in the use of an inordinate amount of judicial resources. My only hope is that the parties have now come to the realization that the destruction both financially and emotionally was not worth it and they will not become embroiled in further litigation in the future. Only time will tell.

After reviewing all the relevant factors, the court concluded that legal costs in the amount of $125,000 were payable by the husband to the wife in the matter.

For the full text of the decision, see:

McCabe v Tissot, 2016 ONSC 4443 (CanLII)

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders. For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

Father Who Paid $400K in Legal Fees to “Cause Financial Harm to the Mother and His Son” Ordered to Pay Mother’s Costs Too


Father Who Paid $400K in Legal Fees to “Cause Financial Harm to the Mother and His Son” Ordered to Pay Mother’s Costs Too

If a father runs up almost $400,000 in legal costs – including nearly $75,000 in expert fees – in pursuit of a low-dollar-value victory in court, should this be considered in assessing legal costs later on?

In Jordan v Stewart, court was asked to allocate legal costs in connection with the parents’ dispute over whether the father’s obligation to pay child support for their now-20-something son should be terminated. The young man had been attending University in London, Ontario but when the father learned that he was switching to a college in Toronto, he applied to have child support cut off, on the basis that the young man would be independent and no longer be living with his mother in London. In fact, the father asked for the termination of his support obligation to be back-dated three years.

The father brought a motion to have the support obligation end; the mother wanted the father’s motion dismissed. Although the issues were relatively straightforward, the hearing took up several days of court time, and required expert evidence and scrutiny of the father’s income.

The father did not get the order he wanted, but the mother wasn’t fully vindicated either, since there were additional legal issues that were also addressed at the same time. Given those rather mixed results, the judge was challenged to apportion legal costs, which under Ontario civil procedure are usually (but not always) given to the winning party. So the court had to determine which of the parents had been the “successful” one in the proceeding so far.

The stakes were potentially high: The father had incurred about $373,000 in costs in preparation for certain proceedings, including almost $75,000 paid to an expert to provide an opinion on his income for child support purposes, for the years 2010 and 2011, based on various financial scenarios. But despite the staggering run-up of costs, the father was asking for only 25% of it from the mother – which was still just under $90,000.

The court rejected the father’s claim that he was the successful party, stating that his rationale “stretch[ed] the reality of the outcome.” Instead, the judge stated that “even if I found the father was somehow technically successful, I would award the mother costs.”

The judge’s stern stance against the father was explained by the following passages from the 130-paragraph ruling:

This case is another example of courts struggling to determine entitlement and quantum of costs. The costs issue is made more complex by the father’s willingness to spend approximately $400,000 in legal and expert fees. This amount is significantly disproportionate to any amount that he advances as his best possible financial outcome. The father also knew that, if successful, he probably would not recover the costs in any significant way from the mother as she has limited financial resources and appeared in court without counsel.

This case is an extreme example of a person who was prepared, as he has been in the past, to spend significant sums of money without concern for costs or outcome.

While I cannot conclude that the father in this case deceived the court in any manner, his willingness to spend money on legal and expert fees so out of proportion to any economic benefit defies logic. The reasonable conclusion is that the father was prepared to cause financial harm to the mother and his son even at incredible expense to himself. He certainly never expected to recover his costs [from her].

He does not seek to recover most of the significant fees he spent, a signal that the money was not a factor in his pursuit of the case or relevant to any resolution. He was prepared to spend more money than any financial benefit to him if he succeeded.

The judge also observed that the mother had made multiple reasonable offers: she had suggested mediation, and offered to accept reduced support.  The judge found these offers were all “worthy of the father’s consideration”, and would have been far more financially beneficial to both parties than what transpired.

In the end, using the father’s own tally of his costs as a representative “measuring stick” of the fair compensation to which the mother should be entitled, the judge awarded her the nearly $90,000 in costs to be paid by the father, plus the $34,000 he already owed her.

For the full text of the decision, see:

Jordan v Stewart, 2013 ONSC 5037 (CanLII)

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders. For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

“The Courthouse is Not a Restaurant,” Says Exasperated Judge

“The Courthouse is Not a Restaurant,” Says Exasperated Judge

The mother was as self-represented litigant who had “very aggressively” pursued multiple claims against the father, and had filed more than 430 documents since their litigation began almost 10 years earlier. Those documents were part of a long history of numerous motions, appeals and a litany of related procedures to contest virtually every aspect of untangling their former relationship, including settling out child custody and support of their two children.
In advance of one of those many motions, the mother had arbitrarily and on short notice absented herself from a half-day court hearing that had been scheduled for March 1, 2013. Less than a week before the motion she had faxed a letter to the court, indicating that she could not attend.

In the court’s e-mail reply, it advised the mother that an adjournment could not be granted without the father’s input, and that since the father’s lawyer would not consent in advance, she could make the request in person at the scheduled hearing date and take her chances.

Instead, the mother failed to show up at the hearing at all. Nor did she call in. She later claimed that she had mixed her calendar up.

The father asked the court for an order forcing the mother to pay for the legal costs he had wasted in preparing for a motion that she did not even bother to attend.

The court, after concluding that the mother’s excuse for missing the hearing date “stretches credulity past its breaking point”, entertained striking out the mother’s motion outright, but ultimately decided to strike it off the list and impose significant costs against her instead.

In its lengthy rebuke of the mother’s conduct, the court wrote:

In coming to my decision I had to deal with a matter of increasing judicial awareness in Canada, namely how to sanction or impose meaningful consequences on irresponsible and inappropriate behaviour by a litigant.


Adding to the difficulties of this case is the “customer-service” expectations that the mother brings to these proceedings. Unlike a retail environment, where the customer is king, the administration of justice cannot possibly proceed in any meaningful way if litigants adopt a customer-service mentality at the courthouse.

The courthouse is not a restaurant where reservations can be rescheduled at the last minute or simply cancelled on the whim of a litigant. Neither can a litigant pick and choose which procedural rules and time deadlines they wish to comply with. The court must impose sanctions on litigants who behave irresponsibly or recklessly.

The court continued:

The attitude and behaviour that the mother brings to this litigation is troubling as it only increases the intensity of the conflict and creates an environment in which any kind of settlement discussions are impossible.

It must be obvious to the mother, even as an unrepresented litigant, that the time deadlines imposed at the case management meetings for the filing of affidavits and briefs and concluding cross examinations are significant and cannot be casually disregarded on a whim. The mother must have known, or ought to have known, that the father would have already incurred significant legal costs in compliance with those deadlines when she attempted to cancel the March 1, 2013 Hearing on less than five business days notice.

Somehow the mother is also oblivious to the obvious fact that by running up the father’s legal bills she is also depriving her children of potential financial resources.

Moreover the mother somehow expects the court to ignore the fact that her last minute demand for an adjournment would not only have a significant financial impact on the father and the children but also on the court’s time and resources. A half day was reserved for the hearing that she demanded and that time slot was denied to other litigants and made an already backlogged list even longer.

The court has a duty to administer its scarce resources wisely and cannot allow litigants to run roughshod over its own process by ignoring deadlines, the rules of court and capriciously failing to show up at scheduled hearings.

After scrutinizing the costs thrown away, the court ultimately awarded the father $3,000, which it intended as:

… a strong message to the mother that her disregard for the rules of court and the meticulous timelines set out at the case management conferences and her unilateral decision to fail to appear at the March 1, 2013 Hearing are totally unacceptable. This kind of behaviour is simply intolerable and must be sanctioned by the court to protect the integrity of the court process and as a warning to the mother and other litigants that this kind of behaviour will have significant consequences.

What are your thoughts about the court’s admonishments? Do too many litigants approach the justice system with a “customer service” mentality, as the court in this case says?

For the full text of the decision, see:

Delichte v Rogers, [2013] M.J. No. 113, 2013 MBQB 93

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders. For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

Self-Represented Wife Asks for $18K in Legal Costs; Court Awards $30K Instead

Self-Represented Wife Asks for $18K in Legal Costs; Court Awards $30K Instead

In McMurter v McMurter, the wife represented herself in the family matter against her former husband, who had a lawyer acting for him in their 15-day trial.

The husband had asked the court to terminate his $2,500-per-month spousal support obligations, but he did not prevail. After hearing all the evidence, the court found there was no material change in either spouse’s financial circumstances to justify such a change.

Pointing out that she had been totally successful at trial, the wife then asked for a court order forcing the husband to pay her full legal fees, including: 1) the legal fees she had already paid a lawyer for representing her up but not including trial, and 2) the fees for the 263 hours she personally spent preparing for and representing herself at the trial, using a rate of $35 per hour. (She had run out of money and was unable to afford to continue paying the lawyer’s retainer). All told, she was requesting a costs order for just over $18,000.

For his part, the husband was willing to pay for, at most, the 263 hours the wife spent preparing herself, but only at a rate of $18.32 per hour, which was what she would otherwise have earned at her regular job. This proposed rate was to compensate for “opportunity cost”, meaning the money she did not earn because she was preparing for trial.

The court was asked to fix the proper amount of legal fees the to which the wife should be entitled.

It started by pointing out that the Family Law Rules contain a presumption that a successful party, like the wife, is entitled to the costs of a case. From that basic premise, a court can adjust the costs award based on various factors, including the importance, complexity or difficulty of the issues, and the time spent on the case. Other decisions have expanded on whether non-legally-trained litigants who ask for costs can automatically expect to be paid the same hourly rate as a lawyer doing the identical work. (Hint: They cannot).

Here, the wife was entirely successful in resisting the husband’s motion to change, and the case was complex. The outcome was of great importance to her, since there was a lot at stake. The court commented that she was exceptionally well-organized and presented her position well, and dealt with complex family legislation and legal issues. As the court put it, “She did the work of a lawyer in addition to the work expected of her as a litigant.”

While it was not appropriate to grant her the full lawyers’ rate, the court awarded the wife 263 hours at $100 per hour, rather than the requested $35 which was “woefully inadequate considering the nature and quality of the work” she did. That higher hourly fee was “reasonable and appropriate for a well prepared and self-represented litigant” who had done work comparable to a junior lawyer in some respects, and to an experienced law clerk in others.

The court also allowed an added 50 hours for legal preparation, for a total of 313 hours. After making some minor deductions, the court awarded a total of $30,000 in costs. It concluded the ruling by saying:

Litigants cannot and should not assume that if a party is self-represented that they will not bear the consequences of a significant cost award in the litigation in the appropriate circumstances if they are unsuccessful.

For the full text of the decision, see:

Costs award:

McMurter v McMurter, 2017 ONSC 725 (CanLII)

Main judgment:

McMurter v. McMurter 2016 ONSC 1225 (S.C.J.)

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders. For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com

Vexatious Litigant Won’t Take “No” for An Answer

Vexatious Litigant Won’t Take “No” for An Answer

Sometimes you hear about Family litigants for whom their dispute against the former spouse has taken on a life of its own, and who will not stop until they have literally exhausted every possible legal and procedural avenue.   The case of Nassr v. Vermette seems to be a great illustration of this scenario.

The former couple had commenced their family litigation in 2009, after which time the husband brought numerous questionable and downright meritless applications and motions. In 2011, pursuant to an order of the court, he was declared a “vexatious litigant” – which means that he was prohibited from commencing or continuing any further proceedings.

About four years later the husband decided he wanted to have that “vexatious litigant” designation set aside. But the court flatly rejected his application, and made an order that declared the designation anew. For greater certainty, the wording made it abundantly clear that he was expressly prohibited from instituting any new legal proceedings, and was prevented from continuing any proceeding previously instituted by him, unless he obtained the court’s permission.

Yet the husband tried to launch another appeal, and duly asked the court for permission to proceed. Although the court granted him an audience, it found that he simply did not meet the test for being allowed to proceed, under s. 140 of the Ontario Courts of Justice Act, and found there was no merit to his appeal anyway. Section 140 deems the court’s decision to be final, so the husband was blocked from appealing the court’s refusal of his application for leave.

In other words, the husband’s road was formally at an end. Or so only it seemed.

The husband tried to appeal yet again, this time focusing on an earlier judgment that had been made dealing with custody, access, and child support. The wife brought a motion to have that appeal attempt dismissed, and she was successful.

In making its ruling, the court emphasized that since the husband had been declared a vexatious litigant, this meant he had no further right to appeal or take any other step. That designation had been validly made by an earlier court, and – under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act – could not be appealed.

The court also rejected the husband’s last-ditch argument, to the effect that the Rules of Civil Procedure should be bent for him.   Under one of its provisions, the court was entitled at any time to decide that compliance with a rule could be dispensed with. The husband claimed he should be given the benefit of the doubt so that his appeal could go forward notwithstanding the prohibition in section 140 of the Act.

The court didn’t buy it. The provision the husband had in mind applied only to the Rules, not to the test for obtaining leave in section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, which is entirely different legislation. The court went ahead and quashed the husband’s appeal.

Not to be deterred, the husband didn’t stop there: He applied for leave to appeal from that Appeal Court decision as well. That application was made to the Supreme Court of Canada, but it was dismissed with costs.

Game over.

For the full text of the decisions, see:

Vermette v. Nassr, 2016 ONCA 658 (CanLII)

Jason Donald Nassr v. Laurie Ann Vermette, 2017 CanLII 5363 (SCC)

At Russell Alexander, Family Lawyers our focus is exclusively family law, offering pre-separation legal advice and assisting clients with family related issues including: custody and access, separation agreements, child and spousal support, division of family property, paternity disputes, and enforcement of court orders. For more information, visit us at RussellAlexander.com